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1 Introduction
It has been recognized that trade openness is likely to be welfare improving in the long-
run, by decreasing prices and allowing countries to expand their production to new mar-
kets. These gains, however, generally neglect important labor market aspects that take
place during the adjustment process, such as displacement of workers in sectors harmed
by import competition and the fact that workers do not move immediately to growing
exporting sectors.
In the last decades China has emerged as powerful player in international trade. In
2013, it surpassed the United States (US) to become the world’s largest goods trader in
value terms. In this paper I study how countries adjust to the rise of China in a world
with imperfect labor markets.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable framework to structurally
quantify the impact of trade shocks in a world with both search frictions and labor mo-
bility frictions between sectors. I calculate changes in real income per capita arising
from the emergence of China using numerical methods, both in the new equilibrium and
along the transition period. My calculations take into account not only the benefits but
also account for potential costs linked to labor market adjustments. I find that China’s
integration generate gains worldwide also in the short-run. However, there are winners
and losers in the labor market.
My dynamic trade model incorporates search and matching frictions from Pissarides
(2000) into a multi-country-sector Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) frame-
work.1 In this set-up goods can be purchased at home, but consumers will pay the least-
cost around the world accounting for trade costs. Hence, individuals benefit from more
trade integration by accessing imported goods at lower costs. On the other hand, a rise in
import competition in a sector will decrease nominal wages and increase job destruction
in this sector. Wages will not be equal across sectors within countries because of labor
mobility frictions, which are added to the model assuming that workers have exogenous
preferences over sectors. To analyze how all these effects interact following a trade shock
I use numerical simulations.
The “China shock” used in my numerical exercise consists of a decrease in Chinese
trade barriers and an increase in Chinese productivity that emulates the growth rate of
1This is a multi-sector version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) where labor is the solely factor of produc-
tion.
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China’s share of world exports following China’s entry to the WTO. I find that northern
economies gain from this shock. For example, annual real consumption in the US and
in the United Kingdom (UK) increase by 1.3% and 2.3%, respectively, in the new steady
state compared to the initial one.
The effects of the shock on wages and unemployment are heterogeneous across sec-
tors within countries. In low-tech manufacturing industries in the UK and in the US,
which face severe import competition from China, workers’ real wages fall and unem-
ployment rises. The fall in the real average wage in this sector is approximately 1.6%
in the US and 0.7% in the UK during the adjustment period five years after the shock.
However, at the same point in time workers in the service sector experience a rise in the
real average wage and no significant change in the unemployment rate: The real average
wage in services increases by approximately 1.9% in the US and 2.5% in the UK.
The numerical exercise also demonstrates the dynamic effects associated with the rise
of China. Immediately after the shock, nominal wages rise in exporting sectors and fall
in industries facing fierce import competition from China. As workers move from sectors
hit badly by China in search of better paid jobs in other industries, wages in exporting
sectors start to fall due to a rise in labor supply. This implies that wages are lower in the
final steady state than during the transition in these industries. In some import competing
sectors, however, the effects go in the opposite direction: Wages fall immediately after
the shock and recover over time.2
In order to perform counterfactual analysis I estimate a sub-set of the parameters of
the model using country-sector level data. I estimate a gravity equation delivered by the
model using data on bilateral trade flows to obtain the trade elasticity parameter. I also
use equations from my theoretical framework to estimate the parameters related to job
destruction and labor mobility frictions between sectors. The remaining parameters are
either calibrated or taken from the literature.
Even though countries experience overall real income gains in my counterfactual
exercise, workers in import competing sectors lose from a fall in real wages and an in-
crease in unemployment not only during the transition but also in the new steady state.
Another prediction from my model is that low-paid (low-productivity) jobs are the ones
2More precisely, in the low-tech manufacturing sector, wages fall during the first five years after the
shock in the US and during the first six years in the UK before starting to recover. Note also that wages in
import competing sectors hit badly by China will still be lower in the new steady state than in the initial
one.
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destroyed in sectors that experience a negative shock. I validate the qualitative predic-
tions discussed above by drawing on detailed employer-employee panel data from one
developed mid-size economy, the UK. Quantitative trade exercises usually focus on the
US. I also look at the US in my counterfactuals, but as a very large and rich country, I
find it useful to validate the micro implications of my model on a smaller and more open
economy, the UK.
By analyzing the period between 2000 (the year before China entered into the WTO)
and 2007 (the year before the “Great Recession”) I provide support for the three main
predictions discussed, i.e., that more Chinese import competition in an industry: i) de-
crease worker’s earnings; ii) increase worker’s number of years spent out of employment;
iii) has a stronger impact on low-paid workers.3
I find that workers initially employed in industries that suffered from high levels
of import exposure to Chinese products between 2000 and 2007 earned less and spent
more time out of employment when compared to individuals that were in industries less
affected by imports from China. I find a negative and significant effects in terms of both
weekly and hourly earnings, and that workers that received lower wages between 1997
and 2000 (a proxy for skills) experienced higher subsequent employment losses between
2000 and 2007.
Many other papers study the effects of trade openness on labor markets by quantify-
ing theoretical models. However, to my knowledge this is the first paper that explicitly
quantifies the effects of a trade shock, the emergence of China, analyzing all the follow-
ing aspects: general equilibrium effects across countries, the dynamic adjustment path
to a new equilibrium (in a set-up where jobs can be endogenously destroyed) and labor
mobility frictions between sectors.4
3My empirical strategy builds on Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014).
4Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2015) develop a dynamic trade model with full employment that takes
into account labor mobility frictions, goods mobility frictions, geographic factors and input-output link-
ages. They calibrate the model to 22 sectors, 38 countries and 50 states in the US to quantify the effects of
the China shock. They find that China was responsible for the destruction of thousands of jobs in manu-
facturing in the US, but the shock generated aggregate welfare gains. di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang
(2014) evaluate the welfare impact of China’s integration considering a multi-sector, multi-country frame-
work and also find that welfare increase in developed economies. Levchenko and Zhang (2013) study not
only the aggregate but also the distributional impacts of the trade integration of China and other develop-
ing economies considering factor immobility, finding that reallocation of factors across sectors contributes
relatively little for aggregate gains, but has large distributional impacts. Both papers, however, consider a
static framework with full-employment. Bloom, Romer, Terry, and Reenen (2014) use a dynamic “trapped
factors” model (with perfect labor markets) to analyze the impact of China’s integration on the growth rate
of OECD countries, finding that it increases the profit from innovation, and hence, the long-run growth
rate.
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An example of a paper that quantifies the effects of a trade shock on labor markets
is Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), where the authors consider a dynamic model
with labor mobility frictions across sectors. They estimate the variance of US workers’
industry switching costs using gross flows across industries and simulate a trade liber-
alization shock. This and other papers in this literature, however, consider a small open
economy set-up, disregarding general equilibrium effects across countries.5
Another strand of the literature quantifies models in which labor markets are imper-
fect taking into account general equilibrium effects across countries, but usually ignore
multi-sector economies (and consequently that workers do not move freely between sec-
tors) and are silent about transitional dynamics, due to the static nature of their frame-
work. The most similar paper to mine in this area is Heid and Larch (2012), that con-
siders search generated unemployment in an Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare
(2012) environment and calculate international trade welfare effects in the absence of
full employment.6
The validation of the predictions of my model also contributes to the literature that
uses worker level information to identify effects of international trade on labor market
outcomes, including out of employment dynamics. Examples are Autor, Dorn, Hanson,
and Song (2014), which considers the China shock to identify impacts on labor markets
in the US, and Pfaffermayr, Egger, and Weber (2007), which uses Austrian data to esti-
mate how trade and outsourcing affect transition probabilities between sectors and/or out
5Another interesting paper is Dix-Carneiro (2014), which estimates a dynamic model using Brazilian
micro-data to study the adjustment path after a Brazilian trade liberalization episode in the nineties. Utar
(2011) calibrates a model using Brazilian data to answer a similar question, while Helpman, Itskhoki,
Muendler, and Redding (2012) use linked employer-employee data to analyze also the trade effects in this
same country, but with a greater focus on wage inequality. Cosar, Guner, and Tybout (2013) and Utar
(2006) use Colombian firm level data to estimate a dynamic model of labor adjustment and study how
the economy fairs following an import competition shock. Kambourov (2009) builds a dynamic general
equilibrium sectoral model of a small open economy with sector-specific human capital, firing costs and
tariff. He calibrates the model using Chilean and Mexican data to quantify the effects of trade reforms
that took place in the seventies and in the eighties in Chile and in Mexico, respectively, finding that if a
country does not liberalize its labor market at the outset of its trade reform, the reallocation of workers
across sectors will be slower, reducing the gains from trade.
6Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2013) construct a static one sector Armington model with frictions
on the goods and labor markets and use a panel data of developed countries to verify the predictions of the
model. Felbermayr, Impullitti, and Prat (2014) builds a dynamic two country one sector model a la Melitz
(2003) to study inequality response to trade shocks in Germany, but consider only a static framework in
their calibration exercise using matched employer-employee data from Germany.
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of employment states.7
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I present my model and discuss its
most important implications. In section 3 I structurally estimate a sub-set of the param-
eters of the model, explain how to numerically compute my counterfactual exercise and
present its results. In Section 4 I validate the key micro implications of the model using
employer-employee panel data from the UK. I offer concluding comments in Section 5.
2 Model
My dynamic trade model incorporates frictional unemployment with endogenous job
destruction (Pissarides, 2000) into a multi-country/multi-sector Costinot, Donaldson, and
Komunjer (2012) framework. I also add labor mobility frictions between sectors using
some features from Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010).
The model takes into account that labor markets are imperfect. The economy is
composed of many countries and sectors. Workers without a job can choose the sector
in which to search for employment according to their personal exogenous preferences.
Within a sector, firms and workers have to engage in a costly and uncoordinated process
to meet each other. Each sector produces many types of varieties, and consumers will
shop around and pay the best available price for each type of variety (considering trade
costs).
The model is tractable and allows the ability to quantify changes in real income per
capita (my welfare proxy) following a trade shock (the emergence of China) consider-
ing not only the positive aspects associated with cheaper consumption goods but also
the potential negative aspects associated with labor market adjustments. My dynamic
framework will also enable me to study how different groups of workers are affected
at different points in time. I start the section by providing the main components of the
model. I then demonstrate how to compute the equilibrium and discuss some of the
implications of the model.
7More broadly, the paper adds to a growing literature on the effects of trade shocks on labor markets,
such as Revenga (1992), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Filho and Muendler (2007), Dauth, Find-
eisen, and Suedekum (2012), Kovak (2013), Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Costa, Garred, and
Pessoa (2014), to cite just a few.
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2.1 Set up
In terms of notation, atk,i represents variable ‘a’ in sector k in country i at time t. Some
variables represent a bilateral relationship between two countries. In this case, the vari-
able atk,oi is related to exporter o and importer i in sector k. Finally, in other cases it
will be necessary to highlight that a variable depends on a worker, on a variety or on a
different productivity level. In such cases, atk,i(l) means that the variable is related to
the worker l, atk,i( j) is a variable associated with the variety j and a
t
k,i(x) is linked to id-
iosyncratic productivity x. For the sake of simplicity, I omit the variety index j whenever
possible.
2.1.1 Consumers
There are N countries. Each country has an exogenous labor force Li and is formed
by K sectors containing an (endogenous) mass of workers Lti,k and an infinite mass of
potential entrant firms. I assume that heterogeneous family members in each country
pool their income, which is composed of unemployment benefits, labor income, firm
profits and government lump-sum transfers/taxes, and maximize an inner C.E.S, outer
Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to their income:8
Max∑
t
∑
k
µk,i
ε
ln
∫ 1
0 (C
t
k,i( j))
εd j
(1+ r)t
.
Where k indexes sectors, ε = (σ − 1)/σ , σ is the constant elasticity of substitution
(between varieties) and Ctk,i( j) represents consumption of variety j. µk,i is country i’s
share of expenditure on goods from sector k, and ∑k µi,k = 1. Note that consumers do
not save in this economy. The dynamic effects in the model arise from labor market
features, as shown below.
8Under the assumption of a “big household” with heterogeneous individuals (employed/unemployed in
different sectors), and that households own some share of firms, household consumption equals its income
Consumptionti = Income
t
i =Wages
t
i+Pro f its
t
i+UnempBene f its
t
i+Tgov
t
i
The government uses lump-sum taxes/transfers Tgovti to pay unemployment benefits and finance vacancy
costs, as will see later. When the economy is aggregated, I must have that total expenditure in a country
(consumption) will be equal to total revenue obtained with its sales around the world.
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2.1.2 Labor Markets
Each sector has a continuum of varieties j ∈ [0,1]. I treat a variety as an ex-ante different
labor market. I omit the variety index j from this point forward, but the reader should
keep in mind that the following expressions are country-sector-variety specific.
Firms and workers have to take part in a costly matching process to meet each other in
a given market. This process is governed by a matching function m(utk,i,v
t
k,i). It denotes
the number of successful matches that occur at a point in time when the unemployment
rate is utk,i and the number of vacancies posted is v
t
k,i (expressed as a fraction of the
labor force). As in Pissarides (2000), I assume that the matching function is increasing
in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Homogeneity implies that
labor market outcomes are invariant to the size of the labor force in the market. For
convenience, I work with θ tk,i = v
t
k,i/u
t
k,i, a measure of labor market tightness.
So the probability that any vacancy is matched with an unemployed worker is given
by
m(utk,i,v
t
k,i)
vtk,i
= q(θ tk,i),
and the probability that an unemployed worker is matched with an open vacancy is
m(utk,i,v
t
k,i)
utk,i
= θ tk,iq(θ
t
k,i).
Workers are free to move between markets to look for a job but not between sectors
as will become clearer later. Unemployed workers receive a constant unemployment
benefit bi. New entrant firms are also free to choose a market in which to post a vacancy
and are constrained to post a single vacancy. While the vacancy is open they have to pay
a per period cost equals to κ times the productivity of the firm.
Jobs have productivity zk,ix. x is a firm specific component, which changes over time
according to idiosyncratic shocks that arrive to jobs with probability ρ , changing the
productivity to a new value x′, independent of x and drawn from a distribution G(x) with
support [0,1]. zk,i is a component common to all firms within a variety, constant over time
and taken as given by the firm (I postpone its description until the end of this subsection).
Conditional on producing variety j, each firm can choose its technology level and profit
maximization trivially implies firms initially operate at the frontier, i.e., all vacancies are
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opened with productivity z (at maximum x).
After firms and workers meet, production starts in the subsequent period. Firms are
price takers and their revenue will be equal to ptk,izk,ix. During production periods, firms
pay a wage wtk,i(x) to employees.
When jobs face any type of shock (including the idiosyncratic one), firms have the op-
tion of destroying it or continuing production. Let Jtk,i(x) be the value of a filled vacancy
for a firm. Then, production ceases when Jtk,i(x) < 0 and continues otherwise. So, job
destruction takes place when x falls below a reservation level Rtk,i, where J
t
k,i(R
t
k,i) = 0.
Defining the expected value of an open vacancy as V tk,i, I can write value functions that
govern firms’ behavior:
V tk,i =−κ ptk,izk,i+
1
1+ r
[q(θ tk,i)J
t+1
k,i (1)+(1−q(θ tk,i))V t+1k,i ]. (1)
Jtk,i(x) = p
t
k,izk,ix−wtk,i(x)+
1
1+ r
[ρ
1∫
Rt+1k,i
Jt+1k,i (s)dG(s)+(1−ρ)Jt+1k,i (x)]. (2)
The value of an open vacancy is equal to the per-period vacancy cost plus the future
value of the vacancy. The latter term is equal to the probability that the vacancy is filled,
q(θ tk,i), times the value of a filled vacancy next period, J
t+1
k,i (1), plus the probability that
the vacancy is not filled multiplied by the value of an open vacancy in the future, all
discounted by 1+ r.
I am implicitly assuming that firms are not credit constrained, even though some
papers, e.g. (Manova, 2008), argue that financial frictions matter in international trade.
So, governments will lend money to firms (financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers)
as long as the value of posting a vacancy is greater or equal to zero. The value of a filled
job is given by the per period revenue minus the wage cost plus the expected discounted
value of the job in the future. The last term is equal to the probability that idiosyncratic
shocks arrive multiplied by the expected value of the job next period, ρ
1∫
Rt+1k,i
Jt+1k,i (s)dG(s),
plus the value that the job would have in the absence of a shock times the probability of
such event, (1−ρ)Jt+1k,i (x).
U tk,i and W
t
k,i(x) are, respectively, the unemployment and the employment value for a
worker. The value functions governing workers choices are:
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U tk,i = bi+
1
1+ r
[θ tk,iq(θ
t
k,i)W
t+1
k,i (1)+(1−θ tk,iq(θ tk,i))U t+1k,i ]. (3)
W tk,i(x) = w
t
k,i(x)+
1
1+ r
[ρ(
1∫
Rt+1k,i
W t+1k,i (s)dG(s)+G(R
t+1
k,i )U
t+1
k,i )+(1−ρ)W t+1k,i (x)]. (4)
The unemployment value is equal to the per period unemployment benefit plus the
discounted expected value of the job next period, given that workers get employed with
probability θ tk,iq(θ
t
k,i).
The value of a job for a worker is given by the per-period wage plus a continuation
value, which is composed by two terms. First, the worker could get the value that the job
would have in the absence of a shock, W t+1k,i (x), a value that is realised with probability
1−ρ . If a shock arrives, with probability ρG(Rt+1k,i ) the shock will be sufficiently bad to
drive the worker into unemployment and he/she obtains only U t+1k,i next period. If after
the shock productivity remains above the destruction threshold, then the worker gets on
average ρ
1∫
Rt+1k,i
W t+1k,i (s)dG(s).
Wages are determined by means of a Nash bargaining process, where employees have
exogenous bargaining power 0 < βk,i < 1. Hence, the surplus that accrues to workers
must be equal to a fraction βk,i of the total surplus,
W tk,i(x)−U tk,i = βk,i(Jtk,i(x)+W tk,i(x)−U tk,i−V tk,i). (5)
2.1.3 Firm Entry and Worker Mobility within a Sector
Remember that workers and firms are free to look for jobs and to open vacancies across
varieties. Hence, at every point in time the unemployment value must be equal for all
varieties that are produced in equilibrium. Because markets are competitive, firms cannot
obtain rents from opening vacancies. This implies that the value of a vacancy will be
equal to zero in any market inside a country. These two conditions can be summarised
as follows,
U tk,i( j) =U
t
k,i( j
′) (6)
V tk,i( j) =V
t
k,i( j
′) = 0, (7)
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where here I explicitly indicate that the unemployment value and the value of an open
vacancy are ex-ante market specific.
The fact that unemployment values are equalised across different varieties (condition
6) implies that ptk,izk,i must be equal across markets that produce in equilibrium. Suppose
that there are two varieties j and j′ with distinct values of ptk,izk,i and without loss of
generality, assume that job market tightness is greater in market j, meaning that it is
easier for a worker to find a job there. In this case, ptk,izk,i must be greater in market
j′, such that the lower probability of finding a job in this market is compensated by
higher wages. However, if this is the case, firms will only be willing to open vacancies
in market j, where they have a higher probability of finding a worker and can pay lower
wages. Hence, the only possible equilibrium is a symmetric one where θ tk,i and p
t
k,izk,i are
equalised across varieties inside a sector in a country. Hence, all varieties also have the
same labor market outcomes Rtk,i and u
t
k,i, as well as the same wage distribution. As will
be discussed below, the only variety dependent variable is the price (a sketch of proof is
presented in Appendix A -).
2.1.4 Worker Mobility between Sectors
Before looking for a job in a particular sector, an unemployed worker must choose a sec-
tor, and in contrast to the variety case, they do not move freely between sectors. I assume
that each worker has a (unobserved by the econometrician) preference νk(l) for each sec-
tor, invariant over time. I further assume that workers know all the information necessary
before taking their decision. Hence, the value of being unemployed in a particular sector
for a worker l, Uˆ tk,i(l), is given by
Uˆ tk,i(l) =U
t
k,i+νk(l).
A high νk(l) relative to νk′(l) means that the worker has some advantage of looking
for jobs in sector k relative to sector k′, for example, because he/she prefers to work
in industry k as it is located in an area where he/she owns a property or his/her family
members are settled. I do not provide a more detailed micro foundation for νk(l) to keep
the model as simple as possible.
So the probability that a worker will end up looking for job in sector k while unem-
ployed is given by
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Pr(Uˆ tk,i(l)≥ Uˆ tk′,i(l) f or k′ = 1, ...K) = Pr(νk(l)≥ ν(l)k′+U tk′,i−U tk,i f or k′ = 1, ...K).
(8)
For simplicity, I assume that νk(l) are i.i.d. across individuals and industries, follow-
ing a type I extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution with parameters (−γζ ,ζ ).9 The
parameter ζ , which governs the variance of the shock, reflects how important non-
pecuniary motives are to a worker’s decision to switch sectors. When ζ is very large,
pecuniary reasons play almost no role and workers will respond less to wage (or proba-
bility of finding a job) differences across sectors. In the polar case of ζ going to infinity,
workers are fixed in a particular industry. When ζ is small the opposite is true and work-
ers tend to move relatively more across sectors following unexpected changes in sectoral
unemployment values.
This assumption implies a tractable way of adding labor mobility frictions to the
model. In my counterfactual exercise, I will be able to analyze how different levels of
mobility frictions influence the impacts on several outcomes following a trade shock. It
also incorporates an interesting effect on the model: It allows sectors with high wages
and high job-finding rates to coexist in equilibrium with sectors with low wages and
low job-finding rates. If there were no frictions (workers were completely free to move)
sectors with higher wages would necessarily have lower job-finding rates (as long as the
value of posting vacancies were equal to zero in both sectors).
Note also from equation 5 that I am assuming that the bargaining game in one sector
is not directly affected by the unemployment value in the other sectors. In my model, an
employed individual (or an individual who has just found a job) behaves as if he/she is
“locked-up” in the sector, i.e., his/her outside option at the bargaining stage in sector k is
independent of the preference shocks νk′(l) in all other sectors. If I further assume that
workers also benefit from this preference shock while they are employed, implying that
a worker in sector k gets a total of W tk,i(x)+ νk(l), then wages will not depend directly
on the ν’s. This assumption is similar to the one used in Mitra and Ranjan (2010).
9The Gumbel cumulative distribution with parameters (−γζ ,ζ ) is given by S(z) = e−e−(z−γζ )/ζ and I
have that E(z) =−γζ + γζ = 0 and Var(z) = pi2ζ 2/6, where pi ≈ 3.1415 and γ ≈ 0.5772.
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2.1.5 Job Creation and Job Destruction
Before workers decide on a sector to look for an open vacancy, job creation and job
destruction take place in this economy:
ut+1k,i = u
t
k,i−m(utk,i,vtk,i)+ρG(Rtk,i)(1−utk,i). (9)
The unemployment rate in period t+1 is equal to the rate at period t reduced by the
number of new matches and inflated by the number of individuals who become unem-
ployed (all terms expressed as a fraction of the labor force). One implicit assumption is
that the labor force remains constant during this process, i.e., all movement of workers
has already taken place. Notice also that this process takes place at the variety level, but
the fact that the varieties are symmetric will permit me to easily aggregate it up to the
sector level.
2.1.6 International Trade
All goods are tradable. Each variety j from sector k can be purchased at home at
price ptk,i( j) (which is equivalent to the term p
t
k,i used in my description of the labor
market, the only difference being that I now make explicit that it is a country-market
specific variable), but local consumers can take advantage of the option provided by a
foreign country and pay a better price. In short, consumers will pay for variety j the
min{dk,oi ptk,o( j);o = 1, ...,N}, where dk,oi is an iceberg transportation cost between ex-
porter o and importer i, meaning that delivering a unit of the good requires producing
dk,oi > 1 units. I assume that dk,ii = 1 and that is always more expensive to triangulate
products around the world than exporting goods bilaterally (dk,oidk,ii′ > dk,oi′).
In any country i, the productivity component zk,i is drawn from a Frechet distribution
Fk,i(z) = e−(Ak,i)
λ z−λ , i.i.d for each variety in a sector. The parameter Ak,i > 0 is related to
the location of the distribution: A bigger Ak,i implies that a higher efficiency draw is more
likely for any variety. It reflects home country’s absolute advantage in the sector. λ > 1
pins down the amount of variation within the distribution and is related to comparative
advantage: a lower λ implies more variability, i.e., comparative advantage will exert a
stronger force in international trade.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the fact that consumers shop for the best price around
the world implies that each country i will spend a share pitk,oi of its income on goods
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from country o in sector k. It is not trivial to calculate this share, however. In the next
subsection I will show that some equilibrium properties will deliver relatively simple
expressions for it. For now, I just assume that it is possible to find an expression for these
expenditure shares. In any case markets must clear
Y tk,o =∑
i′
pitk,oi′Y
t
i′ , (10)
where Y ti′ = ∑kY
t
k,i′ is aggregate income in country i
′. Following Krause and Lubik
(2007) and Trigari (2006), I assume that the government pays for unemployment benefits
and vacancy costs through lump sum taxes/transfers. This implies that aggregate income
in a sector is given by the total revenue obtained from sales around the world.
2.2 Steady State
I analyze the steady state of the economy, henceforth omitting the superscript “t”. My
first key equation is the Beveridge Curve, the point where transition from and to employ-
ment are equal. I find it by using Equation 9 and my definition of θ = v/u,
uk,i =
ρG(Rk,i)(1−uk,i)
θq(θk,i)
. (11)
From the free entry condition 7 combined with equation 1, I can find the value of the
highest productivity job,
Jk,i(1) =
(1+ r)κ pk,izk,i
q(θk,i)
. (12)
Equation 12 is the zero profit condition, which equates job rents to the expected cost
of finding a worker. Using equation 2 to find Jk,i(1) and Jk,i(Rk,i) = 0, and subtracting the
second expression from the first, I obtain Jk,i(1) = (1+ r)pk,izk,i(1−βk,i)(1−Rk,i)/(r+
ρ). By combining 12 with the last expression, I obtain:
κ
q(θk,i)
=
(1−βk,i)(1−Rk,i)
r+ρ
. (13)
This is the job creation condition. It equates the expected gain from a job to its
expected hiring cost. Note that this expression is independent of zk,i and pk,i because
both revenue and costs for the firm are affected by these variables linearly.
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I can find a relatively simple expression for wages that holds inside and outside the
steady state. To do this, I combine equations 2, 3, 4, 5 and 13 to get:10
wk,i(x) = (1−βk,i)bi+βk,ipk,izk,i(x+κθk,i). (14)
Wages are increasing in prices and in the productivity parameters. And the job de-
struction condition can then be derived by manipulating expressions 2 and 14 (and using
the fact that Jk,i(Rk,i) = 0):11
bi
pk,izk,i
+
βk,iκθk,i
1−βk,i = Rk,i+
ρ
r+ρ
1∫
Rk,i
(s−Rk,i)dG(s). (15)
It shows a positive relationship between θk,i and Rk,i: a greater number of vacancies
(higher θk,i) increases the the workers’ outside options, and hence, more marginal jobs
are destroyed (higher Rk,i).
Symmetric varieties will permit me to find relatively simple expressions for the trade
shares of each country around the world. Since the term pk,izk,i is constant across va-
rieties and zk,i is a random variable, it must be that the price of each variety is also a
random variable inversely proportional to zk,i. There are some ways to see this. One of
them is to use my wage equation 14 to find the highest wage in the sector, wk,i(1), and
subtract from it the lowest wage, wk,i(Rk,i). This will imply that:
pk,i( j) =
1
zk,i( j)
wk,i(1)−wk,i(R)
βk,i(1−Rk,i) =
w˜k,i
zk,i( j)
. (16)
w˜k,i is simply a way of writing the slope of the wage profile in the sector. For ev-
erything else constant, a steeper wage profile implies that the wage bill in the country is
higher, and prices will also be higher.
I am now in the position to calculate trade shares around the world. Given iceberg
trade costs, prices of goods shipped between an exporter o and an importer i are a draw
from the random variable Pk,oi=
dk,oi w˜k,o
Zk,o
. The probability that country o offers the cheap-
10First, I multiply equations 4 and 2 by 1−β and β , respectively, and subtract the second from the first.
Then, I use the sharing rule 5 to expressW t+1k,i (1)−U t+1k,i as a function of Jt+1k,i (1) = (1+ r)κ ptk,izk,i/q(θ tk,i)
(see 13 above), and substitute for W t+1k,i (1)−U t+1k,i in equation 3. By combining the two expressions
obtained, I get the wage equation 14.
11I substitute for wk,i(x) in 2 using expression 14 to find the value of Jk,i(x). Then, I substitute for Jk,i(x)
inside the integral of equation 2 and evaluate the expression obtained at x= Rk,i.
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est price in country i is
Hk,oi(p) = Pr(Pk,oi ≤ p) = 1−Fk,o(dk,oi w˜k,o/p) = 1− e−(pAk,o/dk,oi w˜k,o)λ , (17)
and since consumers will pay the minimum price around the world, I have that the
distribution of prices actually paid by country i is
Hk,i(p) = 1−
N
∏
o′=1
(1−Hk,o′i(p)) = 1− e−Φk,ip
λ
, (18)
where Φk,i = ∑o′(Ak,o′/dk,o′i w˜k,o′)λ , is the parameter that guides how labor market
variables, technologies and trade costs around the world govern prices. Each country
takes advantage of international technologies, discounted by trade costs and the wage
profile of each country.
Hence, I can calculate any moment of the price distribution, including the exact price
index for tradable goods in steady state,
Pi =∏
k
(Pk,i)µk,i, (19)
where Pk,i = γ(Φk,i)(−1upslopeλ ), γ = [Γ(λ+1−σλ )]
1/(1−σ) and Γ is the Gamma function
(and remember that µk,i is the share of country i’s income allocated to consumption of
sector k goods).
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), I calculate the probability that a country o provides
a good at the lowest price in country i in a given sector:
pik,oi =
(Ak,o/dk,oi w˜k,o)λ
Φk,i
. (20)
pik,oi decreases with labor costs of exporter o (or with trade costs dk,oi), and increases
with absolute advantage of exporter o. Notice that expression 16 also holds outside the
steady state, and hence, trade shares at any time t can be calculated in a similar fashion.
Eaton and Kortum also show that the price per variety, conditional on the variety
being supplied to the country, does not depend on the origin, i.e., the price of a good that
i actually buys from any exporter o also has the distribution Hk,i(p). This implies that
average expenditure does not vary by country of origin. Exporters with cheaper wages or
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with lower trade costs take advantage by exporting a wider range of goods. Because there
is a continuum of goods, it must be that the expenditure share of country i on varieties
coming from o is given by the probability that o supplies a variety to i,
Xk,oi
Xk,i
= pik,oi, (21)
where Xk,oi is country i’s expenditure on goods from o, and Xk,i =∑o′ Xk,o′i is its total
expenditure in a given sector.
To close the model I have to find an expression for income in country i. Income in
the sector is given by its total revenue12
Yk,o = w˜k,oLk,o(1−uk,o)(G(Rk,o)+
1∫
Rk,o
sdG(s)). (22)
The market clearing condition in steady state implies that
Yk,o =∑
i′
Xk,oi′ =∑
i′
pik,oi′µk,i′Yi′. (23)
Finally, the Gumbel distribution allows me to calculate a simple expression for the
number of individuals attached to each sector by using expression 8. I must have that the
share of workers in each sector equals the probability that a worker is looking for a job
in that sector whenever he/she is unemployed. And it can be shown that this probability
will be equal to:13
Lo,k
∑k′ Lo,k
=
eUk,i/ζ
∑k′ e
Uk′,i/ζ
, (24)
where Uk,i = 1+rr (bi+
βk,i
(1−βk,i)κ pk,izk,iθ).
12To calculate production I follow Ranjan (2012). First, note that output changes over time equals (i) the
output from new jobs created at maximum productivity θk,iq(θk,i)uk,i, plus (ii) the output of the existing
jobs that are hit by a shock and survive ρ
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s), minus (iii) the loss in production due to destroyed
jobs ρQk,i, where Qk,i equals production per worker in the sector. Setting the total change to zero, I find
Qk,i = (1− uk,i)(G(Rk,i)+
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s)). I then multiply it by w˜k,i and by the total number of workers in
each variety market and integrate over the mass of varieties being produced to find revenue. The only
non-constant term among varieties is the number of workers, that must sum up to Lk,i. I also use the fact
that in Pissarides’ model rescaling the labor force does not affect equilibrium outcomes.
13See Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), online Appendix, for a similar proof.
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To find my steady state equilibrium, note that from the labor market equations (11,
13 and 15) I can find the values of Ri,k, θi,k and ui,k as a function of w˜i,k for every
country and sector. I can then use the trade share equation, also expressed as a function
of w˜i,k, together with my market clearing condition above to find the relative values of
the slope of the wage profile that balance trade around the world. Finally, the labor force
size in each of the sectors can be determined through the equation that determines the
share of unemployed individuals in each sector. Naturally, all these effects take place
simultaneously, and hence, I have to solve the system of non-linear equations described
above to find my endogenous variables.
In short, I use the Beveridge curve (11), the job creation (13) and job destruction (15)
conditions, the market clearing equation (23) together with the trade share expressions
(20) and the unemployment share condition (24), to find my endogenous variables Ri,k,
θi,k, ui,k, w˜i,k, Li,k for al i’s and k’s. There are a total of NxK equations of the type of
Equation 23, but only NxK− 1 independent ones. I have to assume that the sum of all
countries’ income is equal to a constant.
2.3 Implications of the Model
Consider a rise in productivity (Ak,o) in a foreign country o or a fall in trade costs (dk,oi)
from the same foreign country to home country i, holding productivity in the home coun-
try fixed. Consumers in the home country will benefit as they have access to cheaper
goods coming from abroad (see equation 19). However, this can also have negative ef-
fects in the labor market. If the demand for goods produced locally fall, prices of local
goods will fall, implying that jobs will have to be destroyed in the home country14 and
nominal wages will decrease. Note that the jobs destroyed in any country-sector fol-
lowing a bad shock are the ones with low idiosyncratic productivity x. These are the
low-paid (low-productivity) jobs in the sector that become non-profitable after a fall in
prices.
The effect on real wages is ambiguous, however. For example, if the rise in produc-
tivity takes place in a sector k in which the home country has a high level of production
and most part of it is exported (meaning that the consumption share µk,i is low in the
14Note that the assumption that the unemployment benefit b is constant plays an important role in my
model. It will imply that wages will not absorb all the impact from shifts in productivity/prices in the
new equilibrium and, consequently, such shocks will have an effect on the unemployment rate even in the
long-run.
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home country), real wages will tend to fall at home in sector k, as the benefits from
cheaper prices are small (if µk,i is zero there is no benefit at all) and nominal wages de-
crease in this sector as the foreign country increases its market share around the world.
On the other hand, if home country i has a low production level in sector k but has a high
consumption share in this sector (high µk,i), then real wages will most likely rise as the
fall in prices will tend to be the dominant effect in the home country.
Workers have preferences over sectors in my model. This means that after a trade
shock some (but not all) unemployed workers will be willing to move from sectors that
experience losses and to start looking for jobs in other sectors. Which sectors lose or
gain in each country will depend on the new configuration of comparative and absolute
advantages around the world following the trade/productivity shock.
The model also delivers interesting dynamic implications that are deeper investigated
in my numerical exercise performed in the next section. After analyzing the results ob-
tained with my counterfactuals, I test some of the observed partial-equilibrium implica-
tions of the model in Section 4 by drawing on detailed worker-level micro-data from one
open developed economy, the UK.
3 Quantification of the Model
My model provides a rich set of mechanisms that are difficult to study analytically. In
this section, I perform a counterfactual numerical exercise to analyze how advanced
economies responded to the emergence of China in a world with imperfect labor markets.
This will allow me to analyze both the transition path to a new equilibrium and the het-
erogeneous effects across sectors within countries. My calculations take into account not
only that labor markets are imperfect and that workers do not move freely across sectors,
but also that exporting sectors can gain from more trade with China and that consumers
have access to cheaper imported goods.
In the first part of this section, I estimate three parameters that will be used in my
counterfactual. In the second part, I demonstrate how to obtain the remaining parameters
(either by calibration from data or from previous papers) and the methodology used to
construct my numerical exercise. In the last part, I present the results and conduct a few
robustness tests considering different parameter values.
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3.1 Structural Estimation
I start by estimating a sub-set of the parameters for the UK (ζ and ρ). Then, I proceed
to estimate the trade elasticity (λ ) using bilateral trade flows. The labor share (β ), the
expenditure share (µ) and the productivity parameter that drives absolute advantage (A)
will be taken directly from the data. All the other parameters will either be calibrated or
taken from previous papers.
3.1.1 Labor Market Parameters
I estimate the probability of an idiosyncratic shock arriving to a job (ρ) and the parameter
that governs labor mobility frictions across sectors (ζ ).
These labor market parameters are estimated only for the UK and used for all other
countries in my counterfactuals. Naturally, it would be more accurate to estimate the
parameters for all the countries considered in the next sub-section, and I recognize that
this approximation may be unsuitable especially for economies that are very distinct, but
data restrictions do not allow me to follow this route and I believe that applying UK
parameters to other countries can still provide important qualitative insights for adjust-
ment dynamics. Estimating these parameters for other countries is an important topic for
future work but is beyond the scope of this paper.
The data used to estimate labor market variables are from different sources and the
regressions used to obtain ρ and ζ are at the industry level (ISIC3 2-digit), at yearly
frequency from 2002 to 2007. Total employment, job creation, and job destruction by
industry are from the Business Structure Database (BSD). Unemployment by sector is
obtained from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) micro-data. I assume that unemployed
individuals are attached to the last industry they worked for, and this information is
available in the LFS.15 Wage data are from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) and vacancy data are from the NOMIS, provided by the UK Office for National
Statistics.
I calculate βk’s as the share of labor costs in value added in each sector in the UK.
They are obtained from firm-level micro-data, the Annual Respondent Database (ARD),
which I aggregate up to the 2-digit ISIC3 level. I set the interest rate r= 0.031 —a value
15Not all unemployed in the LFS respond to the question related to the last industry of work, so I assume
that the industry share of unemployed individuals is equal to the industry share of unemployed that actually
responded to this question, something that is likely to add measurement error to my estimates.
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in the range used by Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) that corresponds to a time
discount factor of approximately 0.97.
I estimate ρ by using the fact that the total number of jobs destroyed in a sector at any
point in time is ρG(Rtk)(1− utk)Ltk. My empirical job destruction measure is calculated
using the BSD. It is the sum of all jobs lost in an industry either because firms decreased
size or ceased to produce in a particular year. I then run the following industry-level
regression,
ln(JobDestructiontk) = ln(ρ)+ ln((1−utk)Ltk)+ ln(G(Rtk))+ ε tk, (25)
where ε tk is a measurement error. Since I do not observe G(), I control for a polyno-
mial function (of 4th degree) of Rtk (the idiosyncratic productivity threshold below which
jobs are destroyed) in the sector.16 The first column of Table 1 shows my OLS result.
The second column restricts the coefficient of ln((1− utk)Ltk) to be equal to one, while
column 3 additionally includes instruments suggested by the model: the lagged right-
hand side variables. Observe that the value of ρ decreases in the 2SLS estimates. The
value I use in my counterfactuals (column 3) corresponds to approximately ρ = 0.0129.
Table 1: Estimates of ρ
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS 2SLS
Total Job Destruction
ln(ρ) -2.697** -2.901** -4.342*
(1.228) (1.163) (2.421)
Restricted Coefficients - Yes Yes
Obs 282 282 282
NOTES: ln(ρ) is the constant term in equation 25, which has total job destruction as a dependent variable and a 4th degree polynomial
function of Rtk and the logarithm of the total number of employed individuals (ln((1−utk)Ltk)) as controls. Yearly data (from 2002 to
2007) at the industry-level (ISIC3 2-digit) obtained from ARD, BSD, NOMIS and LFS. Column (3) uses the lagged control variables
as instrument. Clustered standard errors at the industry-level in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
ζ can be found using the shares of workers employed in each sector. My model
predicts that the number of workers increase in a sector whenever wages increase and/or
it is easier to find a job. So, I use an equation that relates increases in the number of
employed individuals to changes in wages and job-finding rates in a sector. To obtain
16I obtain Rtk using ARD. First, I calculate average labor productivity by firm. To adjust for outliers I
windsorize the labor productivity measure per industry, both at the top 99th percentile and at the bottom
1st percentile. Second, I divide each firm-level labor productivity by the maximum value in the industry,
such that the distribution of productivity in each sector is between zero and one as suggested by the model.
Third, I obtain Rtk as the minimum of the normalised labor productivity measure in each sector.
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this equation, I make the strong assumption that the economy is in a different steady
state in every year of my sample.
From the steady state versions of equations 3 and 4, I can write the following expres-
sion:17
∆ln(Lk) =
1
ζ
∆
JFRkwk(1)
1+ r
+ψk+ψt+ εˆ tk, (26)
where JFRtk (equivalent to θ
t
kq(θ
t
k) in my model) is the probability of a worker finding
a job in the sector, and εˆ tk is a measurement error. This is obtained directly as total job
creation (from BSD) divided by the total number of unemployed (calculated using LFS
and BSD). wtk(1) represents the maximum wage in the sector. To account for possible
outliers in the data, I use the 95th percentile of the wages in the industry from ASHE
instead of the maximum value. The estimates consider normalised wage values such that
the average in the sample is equal to 1. Results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimates of ζ
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
Change in the Labor Force
1/ζ 0.032*** 0.027
(0.008) (0.029)
95thPercentile Yes Yes
Obs 285 285
NOTES: ζ is the coefficient of ∆ JFRkwk(1)1+r in equation 26, which uses the change in the number of workers in a industry over time
as a dependent variable and fixed effects for time and industry as controls. ∆ JFRkwk(1)1+r is the difference over time between the
product of the job finding rate and maximum wages (calculated as the 95th percentile) in the sector. Yearly data (from 2002 to
2007) at the industry-level (ISIC3 2-digit) obtained from ASHE, BSD, NOMIS and LFS. Column (2) has the lag of JFRkwk(1)1+r as
instrument. Estimates consider normalised wage values such that the average in the sample is equal to 1. Clustered standard errors
at the industry-level in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
Column 1 shows my OLS estimates, while the second column presents the 2SLS
estimates using the lagged value JFRkwk(1) as an instrument. My estimates of ζ are
higher than the ones in Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), corresponding to ζ =
36.57 on column 2, the value that will be used in my counterfactuals. Indeed, in my
17First, from 3 and 4 I can write U tss1k −U tss0k =
JFRtss1k w
tss1
k (1)
1+r −
JFRtss0k w
tss0
k (1)
1+r +Θ(k, t), where JFR
t
k is
the job finding rate (equivalent to θ tkq(θ
t
k) in my model) and w
t
k(1) is the maximum wage in the sector.
t = tss0 and t = tss1 represent the final and initial steady state, respectively. Θ(k, t) is a sector-time-level
function that depends on present and future variables in the sector, which I approximate using two distinct
fixed effects, one for time and the other for sectors. Obviously this is not a very rich approximation, but
permits me to take a very simple equation to the data, which is obtained by taking logs and first differences
of 24 and using the value of U tss1k −U tss0k written above.
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model this coefficient should be higher as it captures all the labor movement frictions
between sectors, while in their paper part of the rigidity is also captured by high fixed
moving costs.18 So, using their estimates in my model would imply that workers are
much more mobile than they actually are, possibly leading my real income per capita
calculations to overestimate gains (or underestimate losses).
3.1.2 Matching Function, Idiosyncratic Productivity and Vacancy Costs
I assume the following constant returns to scale matching function:
m(vtk,u
t
k) = m(u
t
k)
1−δ (vtk)
δ .
I use the estimates from Borowczyk-Martins, Jolivet, and Postel-Vinay (2013, Table
1), δ = 0.412. To find m, I start with an estimate of 0.231 (from the same paper) and
adjust the parameter such that the probabilities of finding workers and vacancies are
always between 0 and 1. The value that will be used is m= 0.19.
In all my counterfactuals I assume that idiosyncratic productivity shocks are uni-
formly distributed between zero and one (Ranjan, 2012). This assumption was not used
in my previous estimates. To verify the robustness of my counterfactuals to this and
other assumptions I perform additional counterfactual exercises with alternative param-
eter values.
The parameter κ , the cost of posting vacancies, is also obtained from another paper.
I consider the same value used in Shimer (2005): 0.213.
3.1.3 Trade Parameters
The trade elasticity λ is estimated using a gravity equation. First, I obtain bilateral
trade flows from the World Input Output Database (WIOD).19 Information on labor mar-
ket characteristics by sector and country comes from the EU KLEMS dataset.20 As
in Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012), I measure the variation in productivity
18Another reason is that in my model this is the elasticity of employed and unemployed workers in
the UK, while in their model they consider only employed individuals in the US. Hence, workers in their
model take into account only wages when moving across sectors, while here workers also look at the
probability of finding a job. Secondly, they consider average wages, while I consider the maximum wage
(95th percentile) as suggested by my model.
19See Stehrer, de Vries, Los, Dietzenbacher, and Timmer (2014) for more details on this database.
20See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for details on the methodology used to construct the dataset.
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across countries and industries using differences in producer price indexes. Producer
price data is taken from the GGDC Productivity Level Database, which is calculated
from raw price data observations at the plant level for several thousand products (often
with hundreds of products per industry, which can be associated with varieties in my
model, as in Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer, 2012).21 These prices are aggregated
into a producer price index at the industry level using output data. I use the inverse of
this measure as my Atk to identify the trade elasticity.
All my gravity estimations are based on the year 2005, and 1997 lags are used as
instruments for my productivity parameter Atk (GGDC data is available only for these
two years). To compare my estimates to Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012), I
restrict my sample to the same 21 developed countries they consider plus China, and I
exclude the so called non-tradable sectors (services). I add China as an importer in all
regressions and whenever possible as an exporter since GGDC (1997) and KLEMS data
are not available for this country.
By taking logs of expression 20, I obtain the following gravity equation: ln(Xkoi) =
λ ln(Ako)+ ln(Xki /Φk,i)−λ ln(w˜ko)+λ ln(dk,oi).
Following Head and Mayer (2013), I replace ln(Xki /Φk,i) with an importer-product
fixed effect. I do not observe w˜ko.
22 In order to control for the last two terms of the
gravity equation and still be able to identify λ as the coefficient of Atk, I replace their
values by a sector fixed effect, an exporter fixed effect, an importer-exporter fixed effect
and a 4th degree polynomial function of labor compensation, total employment, hourly
wage and labor share for each exporter-sector pair.23 So, I run the following regression
at the sector-exporter-importer-level
ln(Xkoi) = λ ln(A
k
o)+ f¯k,o+χik+χk+χo+χoi+ ε¯oi,k, (27)
where the χ are the respective fixed effects and f¯k,o is the 4th degree polynomial of
exporter labor market variables. ε¯oi,k is a measurement error. The results are shown in
Table 3:
Controlling for labor market characteristics decreases the coefficient, while using
21See Inklaar and Timmer (2008) for more details.
22With the data used in the paper, w˜ko could be recovered only for the UK.
23Including measures for trade costs such as distance, RTA’s and common language do not change the
coefficient values significantly, and it is difficult to interpret their coefficients as they are obtained only
after some fixed effects are dropped. Hence, I choose to omit them.
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Table 3: Estimates of λ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Bilateral Trade Flows
λ 1.120*** 1.791*** 1.178*** 4.934***
(0.458) (0.471) (0.331) (1.327)
China as an Exporter Yes - - -
Labor Market Controls - - Yes Yes
Obs 6866 6194 6194 6194
NOTES: λ is the coefficient of the productivity measure Ako in equation 27, which uses bilateral trade flows at the sector level as the
dependent variable and fixed effects for industry, importer-sector and exporter fixed effects. Labor Market Controls is a 4th degree
polynomial function of labor compensation, total employment, hourly wage and labor share for each exporter-sector pair. Data is a
cross-section of bilateral trade data in 2005 at the WIOD industry-level (roughly ISIC3 2-digit). Data obtained from WIOD, KLEMS
and GGDC. Column (4) has the lag of Ako (1997 value) as instrument. Clustered standard errors at the exporter-industry level in
parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
lagged productivity values as instruments increases it considerably. I use the value of
4.934 in my counterfactuals, which is not far from Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer
(2012) estimates.
3.2 Counterfactuals
The counterfactuals performed are meant to understand how the rise of China affected
other countries in the world, especially the UK. The trade shock I have in mind is one
whereby Chinese productivity increases (Ak,CHN rises 25%) and all trade costs between
China and the rest of the world fall (dk,oCHN and dk,CHNi fall 25%) in all sectors apart
from services. This shock implies that China’s export shares around the world increases
from 0.12 to 0.2 between the two steady states. This corresponds to a growth of 64%
in China’s share of world exports, a magnitude not very different from the one observed
between 2000 (the year before China joined the WTO) and 2004 in the WIOD data
(65%). So, my shock aims to mimic the four year period following China’s entry into
the WTO in terms of percentage change in the its export share. I study how countries
respond to this shock during the transition to a new steady state.
To calculate the initial equilibrium, I use the parameters estimated in the previous
subsection. My counterfactuals also require values for worker’s labor share (βk,i) and the
size of the labor force in each country, both obtained from the WIOD - Socio Economic
Accounts.24 Labor shares are calculated as labor compensation divided by value added
24Available at http://www.wiod.org/newsite/database/seas.htm.
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(at the same level as the WIOD bilateral trade data, roughly the ISIC3 2-digit industry).25
The expenditure share of each country on goods from a particular sector (µk,i) is calcu-
lated from the WIOD data. The values of βk,i’s and µk,i’s can be seen in the Appendix,
Table B.1.
In my counterfactual exercise, I reduce the number of countries to six due to compu-
tational reasons. The “countries” chosen are China, US, UK, European Union (EU), the
Rest of the World (RoW) Developed and the RoW Developing. The last economies are
an aggregation of the remaining WIOD countries, which were separated in high-income
(Australia, Japan, Canada, South Korea and Taiwan) and low-income countries (Brazil,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and Russia). I also aggregate the economy into five
sectors:
-Energy and Others: Energy, Mining and quarrying; Agriculture, Forestry and fish-
ing;
-Low-Tech Manufacturing: Wood products; Paper, printing and publishing; Coke and
refined petroleum; Basic and fabricated metals; Other manufacturing.
-Mid-TechManufacturing: Food, beverage and tobacco; Textiles; Leather and footwear;
Rubber and plastics; Non-metallic mineral products.
-High-Tech Manufacturing: Chemical products; Machinery; Electrical and optical
equipment; Transport equipment.
-Services: Utilities; Construction; Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles; Retail sale of fuel; Wholesale trade; Retail trade; Hotels and restau-
rants; Land transport; Water transport; Air transport; Other transport services; Post and
telecommunications; Financial, real estate and business services; Government, educa-
tion, health and other services; Households with employed persons.
The manufacturing rank of technology is based on R&D intensity in the US in 2005
from OECD STAN database. The productivity measures (Ak,i’s) are from the GGDC
database (described above). I aggregate countries and sectors using value added as
weights. The productivity parameters used in the counterfactuals are displayed in Ta-
ble B.2, which indicates that China has an absolute advantage in all the sectors. This
advantage is most likely because GGDC is based on price data, and China provides the
25I intentionally decrease China’s share of value added in agriculture to the second-highest value in
agriculture, which in this world is 0.32. The original value corresponded to an extremely high value of 0.8
and was generating problems in my numerical simulations.
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cheapest goods globally. This measure does not take into account, for example, that
the UK produces higher quality goods such as airplanes and more advanced cars. Thus,
instead of estimating trade costs, I calibrate an additional parameter that includes trade
costs such that trade shares (pik,oi) are as close as possible to the values observed in the
WIOD. Put another way, I substitute for dk,oi (the iceberg trade cost described previously)
in all my expressions using d¯k,oi = dk,oi ∗ωk,oi, where ωk,oi is an unobserved component
that accounts, for example, for quality difference across countries. Then, I calibrate the
d¯k,oi’s such that trade shares are as close as possible to the ones observed in the data. The
fact that trade costs are not identified does not play a large role in my counterfactuals,
since I am interested in their relative changes (and also in relative income changes).26
In my initial steady state equilibrium, I set the unemployment benefit (bi) to a frac-
tion of the average wage in each country: UK 0.36, China 0.18, US 0.4, EU 0.5, RoW
Developed 0.5 and RoW Developing 0.14.27 These values will be fixed throughout my
counterfactual exercises, as described in the model. This assumption is not innocuous.
It will imply that wages will not absorb all the impact from shifts in productivity/prices,
and consequently, such shocks will have an effect on the unemployment rate.
My parameter ζ is held as 36.57 times the average wage in each country in the initial
equilibrium, and then kept fixed as well.28 The summary of all the parameters used are
in Table 4.
I am then able to find the values of Rk,i, uk,i, θk,i, w˜k,i and Lk,i in my initial steady
state. The model performs relatively well in terms of fitting the size of the labor force in
each sector.29
26I also assume that d¯k,oo = 1 for all countries, as I am able to calibrate only relative values for d¯’s. One
consequence of calibrating trade costs this way is that China and the RoW developing will have access
to the cheapest goods in the world because they are produced by these two countries and their exporting
costs are relatively high. This implies that in my initial equilibrium, the rich countries (the UK, US and
Eurozone) have a high expenditure on goods around the world but not necessarily the highest real income.
27These values are based on Munzi and Salomaki (1999) and Vodopivec and Tong (2008), for the UK,
EU, RoW Developed and China. The UK value is relatively low because much of the retained income
after a job loss in the UK does not come from unemployment benefits, as this is quite small (Job Seekers’
Allowance (JSA) nowadays in the UK varies between £57.35 and £113.70 per week and covers a period of
approximately 6 months). The US value is based on Shimer (2005), and the value of RoW developing was
set slightly below that of China. In my initial steady, state unemployment rates are 0.0479, 0.0575, 0.0256,
0.0399, 0.0391 and 0.0235 in the UK, EU, China, US, RoW Developed and RoW developing, respectively.
28This implies that different countries will have different values for this parameters, but all the countries
will have the same labor market frictions as the variance of the unobserved preference over sectors will be
the same in each country.
29The labor force predicted by the model and the labor force observed in the data have a correlation of
63%.
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Details about the method used to compute the transition path can be found in the
Appendix (Subsection B.2). The objective is to find a rational expectations path between
the initial and the final steady state. I use a type of multiple shooting algorithm that builds
on Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2008) and
Lipton, Poterba, Sachs, and Summers (1982). In my algorithm I have to assume a certain
number of years for the transition period to occur.30 I consider 25 years in my numerical
exercises, but the higher the number of years assumed the closer the variables of the
system are to their new steady state values in the final period of the algorithm. In my
numerical simulations approximately 90% of the real income adjustment has taken place
in year 25.
3.2.1 Results
Real income (or real consumption) is defined as income divided by the price index: Yi/Pi.
The analysis will be relative to the initial equilibrium values. Following several papers
in the international trade literature, I use real income per capita as a proxy for welfare
(in Appendix B.4 I present a measure that incorporates changes in workers’ utility from
switching sectors, as well as changes in their real value functions).
Figure 1a shows the evolution of countries’ real income per capita (or real consump-
tion per capita) over the 25 years following the fall in trade costs and productivity gains
in China. One can see that income instantly increases in all countries, either because the
countries are able to export more to China or because consumers have access to cheaper
goods.31 All countries benefit in the new steady state as well. Chinese citizens experi-
ence large income gains of more than 23% during the transition period (see Figure 1b).
Some countries, such as the EU, experience an initial overshooting in real income
(initial gains of approximately 1.1%). One reason behind this is that after the shock
wages (and prices) do the majority of the “heavy-lifting” in the short-run to keep mar-
kets cleared, as production is rigid (especially upwards) because it takes time for jobs
to be created due to the search and matching frictions in the labor market. Immediately
after the shock, nominal wages rise in the exporting sectors and fall in the ones facing
30Such types of non-linear systems of equations can only be guaranteed to converge asymptotically -
see Lipton, Poterba, Sachs, and Summers (1982).
31Itskhoki and Helpman (2014) carefully characterize the transition period following a trade shock with
imperfect labor markets. They also show that countries gain in the short-run because benefits from trade
arise instantaneously after a fall in trade costs.
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Figure 1: World Real Income
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Real income relative to the initial steady state equilibrium.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
fierce import competition from China. Hence, the overshooting of wages accruing to
EU workers (together with the fact that consumers have access to cheaper goods) ex-
cessively benefits this “country” in the short-run. Other countries such as the UK and
the US exhibit an initial jump in real income (2.33% and 1.25%, respectively) and then
experience a mild income increase followed by a moderate decrease. This is so because
the overshooting of wages accruing to workers is mild or non-existent, generating gains
that can be lower in the short-run.
Overshooting of nominal wages in a sector generally occurs when the amount of
labor used in the final steady state is large relative to its initial equilibrium value. If
this is the case, many jobs will have to be created after the shock, and hence, many
workers and firms need to be “attracted” to the sector. This implies an overshooting of job
surplus immediately after the shock, and hence, in wages.32 The undershooting of wages
tends to be less pronounced and it is more difficult to be observed as job destruction can
take place faster than job creation.33 Hence, real income overshooting takes place in
countries such as the EU because the number of workers initially in sectors that benefit
from more Chinese trade (experiencing overshooting of wages) is sufficiently high, while
32This overshooting also increases the production cost in the sector and help to keep markets clear in
the short-run.
33In addition, because the overshooting of wages happens more frequently, and this implies higher costs
that are passed-through prices, the price indexes will generally decrease over time until the new steady is
reached. This is the case for the US and for the UK, for example.
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in countries like the US this is not the case.
Countries experience different levels of income changes. These levels depend on how
the shock changes comparative advantages around the globe and on countries’ consump-
tion share (µ in the model) in each sector. For example, after the shock, China’s com-
parative advantages tend to increase for manufacturing goods, especially in Low-Tech
manufacturing. This implies that China will be able to export more goods at cheaper
prices. If a country has a significant amount of resources allocated to the production of
Low-Tech manufacturing products in the initial equilibrium, it will be hurt more severely
by China. This seems to be the case for the RoW Developing, i.e., those with the smallest
gain in real income.
The effects are not only heterogeneous across countries but also across sectors within
countries, as shown in Figures 2a and 2b, which plot the adjustment in real wages in the
UK and in the US, respectively. The only sector that experiences a fall in real wages is
the Low-Tech Manufacturing one. The competition from Chinese imports is so severe in
this area that the positive effects arising from cheaper Chinese goods are not sufficient to
offset the negative effects associated with a fall in demand for UK/US goods. The falls
in wages can be as high as 1.7% in the US and 0.8% in the UK. It is also interesting to
note that real wages drop and then continue to fall before improving slightly. The rise
is mainly because price indexes decrease over time in both countries (and also because
conditions in the sector improve slightly over time).
Figures 3a and 3b display unemployment by sector in the UK and in the US. Initially,
there is a rise in unemployment in the manufacturing sectors (especially in the Low-Tech
and High-Tech in the UK and in all manufacturing in the US), followed by another jump
downwards (mainly in Low-Tech manufacturing). This pattern occurs because after the
initial shock, a mass of jobs is destroyed in these sectors. Then, in the next period, un-
employed workers start to move toward sectors in which conditions are relatively better
(Energy and Others and Mid-Tech Manufacturing in the UK; Services and Energy and
Others in the US).34 The Services sector is almost neutral in terms of labor force change
in both countries. Labor moves toward the Energy and Others sector for two reasons.
First, in the GGDC dataset countries such as the UK and the US have a comparative
34Figures B.1a and B.1b in the Appendix, which present the relative size of the labor force in each sector
following the trade shock, show more clearly which sectors grow or shrink relative to the initial size of the
labor force.
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Figure 2: Relative Real Wages per Sector in the UK and in the US
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Legend in panel (a) is valid for both panels.
advantage in this sector (see Table B.2).35 Second, China has a high expenditure share
in this sector compared to other countries. So, as China rises, countries with higher
comparative advantages in Energy and Others, including the UK and the US, benefit by
sending more goods to China.
An additional interesting point is illustrated in Figure B.2a in the Appendix. Wage
inequality, the ratio of the maximum to the minimum wage in the UK, falls after the
trade shock. In import competing sectors, the least productive (worst paid) jobs are the
ones that are destroyed, implying that the intra-sector gap between the minimum and
the maximum wages will close.36 In the exporting sectors, it is possible that the opposite
takes place, i.e., the gap between the minimum and the maximum wage may be widening,
as lower productive jobs can now exist in this sector due to a rise in demand. Overall,
the first effect is the dominant one in the UK, bringing wage inequality down.37 The fall
in wage inequality is small, however.
35Considering the way this database is constructed, one can infer that this may also reflect that goods in
these industries are cheaper.
36This result is common to some models with endogenous job destruction. After a “bad” technology
shock in a sector, the least paid jobs are destroyed. This will tend to increase overall productivity in any
country following an increase in import competition. Moreover, this will always decrease wage inequality
within an industry but does not generate clear predictions regarding country overall wage inequality in a
multi-sector case.
37Wage inequality falls considering also another measure, the ratio between the maximum wage and the
unemployment benefit (see Figure B.2b in the Appendix).
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rate per Sector in the UK and in the US
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Legend in panel (b) is valid for both panels.
3.2.2 Robustness
I also verify the robustness of my results to changes in parameters values. With the
exception of the new value of λ , taken from the Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer
(2012) preferred specification, all the other new parameter values are taken from previous
estimates not used in my main exercise. In my robustness exercises, I consider only the
aggregate effects by country and the effects by sector in the UK only.
For example, reducing labor mobility frictions across sectors (using ζ = 31.25 from
Table 2, column 1) indicates that real income levels increase both in the transition and in
the new steady state (see Figure B.4 in the Appendix), but the difference is small. The
number of workers that decide to relocate to other sectors is also higher. This exercise
suggests that reducing labor mobility frictions allows countries to benefit more from
trade shocks.
Increasing the trade elasticity λ to 6.453, as in Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer
(2012), reduces overall income gains, as countries benefit less from differences in com-
parative advantages around the world following the shock (see Figure B.5).
An increase in job destruction (setting ρ = 0.0674 from Table 1, column 1) does not
change the aggregate results considerably (see Figure B.6). However, unemployment
levels are extremely high at every point in time (including the initial steady state), and
the reallocation of workers across sectors is slightly different.
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4 Micro Implications of the Model
The previous counterfactual results show that all countries gain from more trade with
China. However, workers in the low-tech manufacturing sector experience a fall in real
wages and a rise in unemployment levels following the emergence of China. This occurs
because in this sector the levels of import competition are strong, and hence, workers
suffer the negative effects from a fall in demand for goods produced domestically. In
this particular case, the negative effects generated by more import exposure to Chinese
products outweighs the positive effects from a fall in consumption prices.
The negative relative effects (across sectors) of Chinese imports on workers outside
China can be seen in Figures 4a and 4b, that plot changes in real wages and unem-
ployment rates, respectively, on changes in Chinese import exposure in a country-sector
pair (as well as a linear fit weighted by employment size in the country-sector in the
initial steady state). Figure 4a shows a negative correlation of -0.66 between changes
in wages and changes in Chinese import competition (both changes calculated across
steady states), and Figure 4b presents a positive correlation of 0.73 between changes in
unemployment rates (considering the initial steady state and the period immediately after
the trade shock) and changes in imports from China (calculated across steady states).
In this section, I test three micro implications of my model using detailed employer-
employee micro-data. I test whether more Chinese import competition: i) decrease
worker’s earnings (Figure 4a); ii) increase worker’s number of years spent out of em-
ployment (Figure 4b); or iii) has a stronger impact on low-paid workers. The last effect
is related to the pattern of job destruction in my model, i.e., when a sector receives a
bad shock (such as high import competition from China) the low-paid (low-productivity)
jobs are destroyed.
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014) study
the impact of the rise of China on workers in the US and find that more Chinese import
competition negatively affected some manufacturing industries, reducing their employ-
ment level. More imports from China also reduced manufacturing worker’s earnings. In
this section, I build on the latter paper to investigate how UK workers are affected by
more import competition from China. Quantitative trade exercises usually focus on the
US, but as a very large and rich country, I find it useful to test the predictions of my
model on a smaller and more open economy, the UK. Drawing on detailed UK data also
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allows me to investigate outcomes not previously analysed by Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and
Song (2014), such as hourly earnings. In the rest of the section I describe the data used in
my reduced form analysis. I then present my empirical strategy and the results obtained
by testing the partial-equilibrium implications of the model.
4.1 Empirical Strategy
I use a combination of a series of rich data sources in my analysis. At the worker level,
my main dataset is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). It is an admin-
istrative dataset containing one per cent of all workers and the sample is based on the
last 2 digits of the National Insurance Number (equivalent to the social security number
in the US) every year since 1997.38 ASHE is a panel dataset and allowed me to extract
information on individuals’ earnings and employment history.
To measure UK exposure to China, I use the same import penetration measure de-
rived in my model (pik,oi), which is the value of imports from a particular country divided
by UK total expenditure on all goods:
38Information is given considering only a reference period, usually some point in April, and includes
weekly and hourly earnings, as well as the main industry of activity of the workplace. While limited in
terms of personal characteristics compared to other surveys, the responses in ASHE are considered to be
more accurate, because they are provided by employers rather than from the employees themselves. ASHE
covers neither the self-employed nor individuals without payment in the reference period.
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Chinese Import Exposure ≡ ImportschiExpenditure ,
where expenditure equals total imports plus total UK sales (shipments) minus ex-
ports. I construct this measure by combining the Business Structure Database (sales per
industry) and the UN COMTRADE database (imports and exports). More details about
these databases can be found in the Appendix. I consider only China, i.e., I do not include
Hong-Kong and Macao in my import exposure measure.39
Data on sales, exports and imports are at the 4-digit industry-level (ISIC3) and are
expressed in real terms (2005 thousand of GBP) deflated by the most disaggregated Pro-
ducer Price Index (PPI) provided by ONS (4-digit SIC for local production and 2-digit
SIC for imports and exports).40
Table C.1 in the Appendix shows the import exposure measure in the tradable sectors
at the 2-digit ISIC3 industry level (agriculture, mining and manufacturing). The highest
levels of import exposure occurred in the low-tech manufacturing sectors. Figure C.1
indicates a negative relationship between changes in ln(employment) and changes in
Importschi
Expenditure from 2000 to 2007 at the 4-digit industry level.
41 The fact that employment
falls more in industries more affected by an import shock from China is closely related
to my counterfactual results of Section 3.
My identification is motivated by Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014). I observe
workers’ industry of activity in 2000 and compute its change in import exposure up to
2007. Under a certain level of mobility frictions between sectors (an assumption in my
model), import shocks to the workers’ initial industry should affect his/her employment
and earnings history from 2001 onwards, as workers can spend more time looking for
a job in the sector and/or will observe a fall in earnings while employed. My basic
estimation equation is:
ylk01/07 = ylk97/00+ β˜1∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk
+ β˜ ′2Z
lk+ ε lk.
The outcomes I analyze are represented by ylk97/00, which will be one of four possi-
39My results in the next subsection do not change substantially if I include these two Special Adminis-
trative Regions.
40Imports and exports deflators are available in two categories: European Union and Non-European
Union flows.
41All my import penetration measures (considering changes or levels) are winsorised at the top 99% and
at the bottom 1%.
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ble variables for employee l working in industry k (in 2000) in the period 2001 to 2007:
i) Total Working Years - the number of years employed; ii) log of Average Weekly Earn-
ings; iii) log of Average Hourly Earnings; and iv) log of Total Earnings - which is equal
to Total Working Years multiplied by average annual earnings.42 All earnings measures
are in real terms (2005 as the base year) and winsorised at the top 99% and at the bottom
1%, and all regressions consider only workers between 17 and 59 years old in the initial
period.
The change in import exposure from China between 2000 and 2007 in the worker’s
industry of activity in 2000 is given by ∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk . The measure is industry spe-
cific. The indexes emphasize it corresponds to worker l’s initial industry k.
I select 2001 as my reference point for workers’ outcomes because China joined the
WTO at the end of this same year. China’s trade liberalization was a gradual process
that started earlier, but to gain access China had to commit to several measures to fur-
ther liberalize trade, such as the reduction of importing duties. China’s entry into WTO
also meant that restrictive importing quotas imposed by the European Union (mainly in
textiles and apparel) would be lifted. Finally, the entry of China into the WTO also im-
plied a considerable reduction in uncertainty for Chinese exporters. Handley and Limao
(2013) show that this reduction in uncertainty in the US indeed contributed to China’s
export boom to the US after the WTO accession.43
The error term, ε lk, represents unobserved components that affect workers’ outcomes
of interest. This term might be correlated with contemporaneous labor demand shocks
in the UK. To identify the “real China effect” in the UK labor market caused by pro-
ductivity gains in China (or falling trade barriers between the two countries), I adopt an
instrumental variable (IV) strategy similar to Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011). My
IV is given by:
IVchi =
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97
∆00/07IEchi,world.
To capture the supply driven Chinese effect I instrument using an interaction be-
42Average annual earnings is equal to Average Weekly Earnings multiplied by 52, the number of weeks
in a year.
43Even though tariffs were largely unchanged after 2001, China joining the trading club led the US to
implement the permanent most favored nation (MFN) status in the following year, which ended the annual
threat to impose high tariffs on Chinese goods. China was not subject to such annual reviews in Europe.
On the other hand, China’s negotiations with the EU were completed later than with the US and much
closer to its accession (2000-2001).
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tween two components. The first one is the industry import exposure to China in 1997
( Imports
lk97
chi
Expenditurelk97 - time invariant). I normalize this measure by the overall exogenous change
in Chinese import shares (Chinese imports divided by total imports) in the world (ex-
cluding the UK and considering all tradable industries)44 between 2000 and 2007. The
identification assumption is that Chinese exports after 2000 were stronger in industries
in which China had higher levels of import exposure to China in 1997. The instrument
will suffer from reverse causality if trade with China and/or UK production in 1997 are
affected by any type of anticipation of post 2000 shocks. To try to mitigate some of
these endogeneity concerns, I add a series of additional controls in my regressions, and I
also construct two different instruments and analyze the robustness of my results to these
alternative IV’s - see Subsection 4.3 below.
The vector Zlk contains individual and industry controls, depending on each regres-
sion specification. All my regressions include average hourly earnings, average weekly
earnings and average time employed between 1997 and 2000. Controlling for these
lagged variables mitigates the concern that I am only picking up worker-level hetero-
geneity associated with changes in Chinese imports. I am interested to see how individ-
uals with similar pre-period characteristics (including previous earnings and labor force
attachment) working in industries that are affected differently by China performed be-
tween 2001 and 2007 in terms of employment and earnings.
I control for some worker’s characteristics, in particular age and sex. ASHE does not
provide information on individuals’ education. To compare individuals with similar ed-
ucational backgrounds and working in similar jobs, I control for occupation fixed effects
at the 4-digit level. I also control for whether the individual was a part-time worker or a
full-time worker in 2000.
I am interested in comparing individuals in similar industries. To accomplish this
I control for several industry characteristics. I use real (log) industry sales, industry
employment level, and real (log) industry exports to China in 2000. To rule out that
Chinese imports are simply capturing a general increase in the trend of UK imports, I
also control for the change in import exposure to China and the rest of the world between
1997 and 1999 and for industry import exposure from the rest of the world in 2000, all
at the 4-digit level. I include a very broad measure of outsourcing in 2000: the share of
input costs in the output value at the 2-digit industry level. This value is obtained from
44This is simply a normalization as this component is constant.
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UK input-output tables. I also control for previous trends in employment by including
pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes for two different
periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry).
To compare industries with similar levels of technologies, I also include R&D inten-
sity (investment in R&D normalised by value added), real purchase of computer services
and real investment in machinery at the 4-digit industry level in 2000. These variables
are available at the firm level in the ARD, which I then aggregate to a 4-digit industry
average using sample weights.
4.2 Validation of the Results
I start by testing whether more Chinese imports decreased earnings and/or time out of
employment. Table 5 presents my main empirical findings. In all the panels, the first
column is a simple OLS, and the remaining columns are estimated by IV and using a
different set of controls. In particular, I add the lagged dependent variables to all columns
(excluding them only makes the results stronger). “Worker Controls” in columns 3 and
5 represent all the individual-level characteristics described previously, while “Industry
Controls” in columns 4 and 5 encompass the industry-level ones.
Table 5 shows that individuals working in industries more exposed to Chinese imports
suffered more negative effects than those who were in industries with a lower exposure.
Each one of the four panels A, B, C and D represent a different dependent variable: Log
of total earnings, total working year, log of average weekly earnings and log of average
hourly earnings, respectively (panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of
employment - see table notes for further details and mean value of dependent variable in
the full sample). In the first column, which presents the OLS results, one can observe
that the coefficients are negative and significant. The IV estimation in column 2 increases
the absolute value of the coefficients, indicating that my OLS estimates in column 1 are
biased toward zero, possibly because labor demand shocks in the UK are positively cor-
related with imports from China in this simpler specification without other controls. My
first stages are strong, as indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap statistics (significant at all
reasonable levels) in the lower part of the panels. When I control for worker’s charac-
teristics in column 3, the coefficients fall but remain significant. This fall is mainly due
to the addition of the 4-digit occupation fixed effects. Controlling for industry charac-
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teristics in column 4 also decreases the coefficients relative to column 2. In column 5,
the most demanding specification that includes the full set of controls, the coefficients
are smaller but remain significant at standard levels, the exception being the coefficient
in Panel B.
In column 5, Panel A indicates a negative effect of imports from China on Total
Earnings (defined as the log of the sum of annual earnings between 2001 and 2007).
With the help of Table C.2 in the Appendix, comparing a worker initially employed
in an industry at the 90th percentile of Chinese import exposure (∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk =
0.079) with a worker employed in an initial industry at the median of Chinese exposure
(∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk = 0.007), column 5 shows that an employee in the 90
th percentile
oberved his Total Earnings fall by 4.11% = 100∗ (−0.572)∗ (0.079−0.007) more than
an employee at the median.
In Panel B, one can see that Chinese import exposure decreases the number of years
spent on employment (Total Working Years) between 2001 and 2007. In column 4 of this
same panel, a worker initially employed in an industry at the 90th percentile of Chinese
import exposure spent 0.14 = (−2.005)∗(0.079−0.007) more years without a job when
compared to a worker at the median. The only non-significant result in the table is the
one in column 5 of the same panel.
Panel C presents the effects on Average Weekly Earnings (defined as the log average
of weekly earnings between 2001 and 2007 considering only the years that the individual
was employed). Comparing individuals initially employed in industries at the 90th and at
the median of Chinese import exposure, column 5 shows that the individual in the highly
affected industry earned 2.25% = 100∗ (−0.313)∗ (0.079−0.007) less when compared
to a worker at the median.
Panel D shows the effects on Hourly Earnings (defined as log average hourly earn-
ings between 2001 and 2007 considering only the years that the individual was em-
ployed). Comparing the same two groups of workers (90th percentile and median work-
ers), column 5 shows that workers at the 90th percentile earned 1.58%= 100∗(−0.220)∗
(0.079−0.007) less. Considering the results presented in Panel B, one can conclude that
Chinese exposure had a greater impact on weekly earnings. This suggests that workers
may be working fewer hours in industries exposed to more Chinese imports.
In sum, Table 5 indicates that more import exposure to China in a sector significantly
decreases the time spent in employment and real average earnings in relative terms across
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sectors). This validates some of the partial-equilibrium effects predicted by the model
(see Figures 4a and 4b).
I now study the effect of Chinese imports on distinct groups of workers in terms of
earnings in the pre-period (1997-2000). I use this as a proxy for the skill level of workers,
assuming that a a low wage implies a low skill level. A rise in import penetration should
have a greater impact on the low-paid workers, especially in terms of employment as
predicted by the model.
My strategy consists of adding an interaction of the change in Chinese import expo-
sure (2000-2007) with average hourly earnings between 1997 and 2000 (H¯E97/00). If
low-paid workers are more affected in terms of employment and earnings, the coefficient
of this interaction should be positive.
Table 6 presents the results. All the columns are estimated using the IV and includ-
ing the full set of controls. In column 2, which considers the effects on Total Working
Years, the positive coefficient of the interaction indicate that low-paid workers are more
affected by China in terms of employment, validating this other implication of the model.
The effects on earnings (columns 1, 3 and 4) do not show any clear pattern, and the co-
efficients are not statistically significant. This suggests heterogeneous effects of Chinese
imports on the unemployment rates of individual workers, not on their wages conditional
on having a job.
4.3 Empirical Robustness
In this subsection, I verify whether the micro implications of my model are robust to
different specifications. I also test the implications of the model using BSD firm-level
data.
4.3.1 Alternative IV’s
I make use of another instrument that builds on Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011).
The instrument uses information on pre-period quotas imposed on Chinese products in
textiles and apparel industries (see the Appendix for a more detailed description of the
IV). Table C.3 shows that the results are qualitatively similar to the ones in Subsection
4.2, giving further support to the implications of my model.
The second alternative IV that I construct is a shift-share type of instrument similar
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Table 5: Employment and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Total Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.849*** -1.224*** -0.804*** -1.040*** -0.572**
(0.287) (0.314) (0.240) (0.338) (0.282)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.504∗∗∗ 37.586∗∗∗ 41.109∗∗∗ 36.881∗∗∗
(8.700) (7.37) (9.120) (7.532)
KP F Stat 23.867 26.009 20.319 23.974
Observations 23433 23428 23427 22800 22799
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -2.003*** -2.639*** -2.086** -2.005* -1.459
(0.646) (0.908) (0.886) (1.030) (1.043)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.441∗∗∗ 37.574∗∗∗ 41.256∗∗∗ 37.162∗∗∗
(8.855) (7.514) (9.094) (7.57)
KP F Stat 22.97 25.007 20.582 24.099
Observations 24888 24882 24881 24195 24194
Panel C Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.422** -0.775*** -0.499*** -0.648*** -0.313**
(0.178) (0.179) (0.150) (0.178) (0.130)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.504∗∗∗ 37.586∗∗∗ 41.109∗∗∗ 36.881∗∗∗
(8.700) (7.37) (9.120) (7.532)
KP F Stat 23.867 26.009 20.319 23.974
Observations 23433 23428 23427 22800 22799
Panel D Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.343** -0.566*** -0.459*** -0.376** -0.220**
(0.142) (0.175) (0.138) (0.173) (0.112)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.505∗∗∗ 37.598∗∗∗ 41.085∗∗∗ 36.846∗∗∗
(8.704) (7.373) (9.132) (7.542)
KP F Stat 23.845 26.006 20.242 23.87
Observations 23418 23413 23412 22785 22784
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in industry j (in
2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to Total Working Years multiplied
by average annual earnings [mean in the full-sample = 11.372]). Panel B) Total Working Years - the number of years employed [mean
in the full-sample = 4.540]; Panel C) log of Average Weekly Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 5.97]); Panel D) log of Average
Hourly Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 2.335]; Panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from 2001
to 2007. Column 1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’
industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average hourly and
weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) between 1997 and 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects (4-
digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes
for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing
measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period
change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW,
real (log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment
in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration
from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering
all tradable industries. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Total Average Average
Total Working Weekly Hourly
Earnings Years Earnings Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -1.715 -8.504*** -0.422 0.279
(1.142) (3.059) (0.704) (0.548)
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure ∗HE97/00 0.580 3.596** 0.056 -0.253
(0.601) (1.547) (0.383) (0.306)
HE97/00 0.407*** 0.186** 0.375*** 0.647***
(0.044) (0.089) (0.023) (0.027)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.477∗∗∗ 43.314∗∗∗ 42.477∗∗∗ 42.475∗∗∗
(11.257) (11.267) (11.257) (11.281)
IVchi*HE97/00 39.269∗∗∗ 39.968∗∗∗ 39.269∗∗∗ 39.234∗∗∗
(7.646) (7.499) (7.646) (7.647)
KP F Stat 12.467 12.507 12.467 12.42
Observations 22799 24194 22799 22784
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nclusters 61 61 61 61
NOTES: Each column represents a different dependent variable. The last three columns exclude individuals with zero years of
employment from 2001 to 2007. All columns estimated by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’
industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average hourly and
weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) from 1997 to 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects (4-digit)
and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes for two
different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure
(share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change
(1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW, real
(log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment in
machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration
from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering
all tradable industries. I also instrument for the interactions above using this same instrument interacted with average hourly earnings.
Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
43
to the one employed by Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014). It is given by:
˜IV chi =
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97∆00/07IE
l j¯
chi,world ,
where ∆00/07IE
l j¯
chi,world is the change in Chinese import exposure (defined as imports
divided by expenditure) in the world (excluding the UK) between 2000 and 2007 in
the worker’s initial 2-digit ISIC3 industry.45 This change in imports is interacted with
1997 Chinese import exposure in the workers’ 4-digit initial industry of employment,
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97 . This instrument does not rely solely on pre-existing conditions, and hence,
will not satisfy the exclusion restriction if there are demand or technology shocks that
shift Chinese exports and are common to all countries in the world. For example, the
growth of Chinese imports around the world may only reflect that many countries chose
to diminish employment in low-tech labor-intensive sectors in which China had a com-
parative advantage, and China simply “filled the gap” in these markets. Table C.4 indi-
cates that the qualitative predictions of my model are generally robust to this alternative
IV. For example, comparing the same two groups of workers (90th percentile and median
workers), Panel D, column 5, shows that workers at the 90th percentile earned 4.45%
= 100∗(−0.618)∗(0.079−0.007) less, and the coefficient is statically significant at 1%
level (standard error of 0.169).46
4.3.2 Alternative Specification
To compare my UK results with those of the US from Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song
(2014), I perform an exercise in which I use a specification more similar to theirs.47 My
estimation equation is now given by:
wlk01/07/wlk97/00 = β˜1
∆00/07Importslkchi
Expenditurelk00
+ β˜ ′2Z
lk+ ε lk.
First, I consider in my sample only individuals employed in all fours year between
1997 and 2000 to study only workers with high labor force attachment in the pre-period,
as in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014). Second, I use a different measure of Chi-
45This measure is constructed using the WIOD database described previously.
46Although this second IV hinges on stronger identification assumptions, this specification also allows
me to add levels of Chinese exposure in 2000 as a control - see columns 4 and 5 of Table C.4.
47See equation 5 and table 1 in their paper.
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nese import exposure, which is now defined as the change in Chinese imports between
2000 and 2007 divided by the expenditure in the UK in 2000 at the 4-digit ISIC3 level in
the worker’s initial industry of employment in 2000,
∆00/07Importslkchi
Expenditurelk00
. The IV strategy used
is the same one from my main results in Table 5, as well as the set of controls Zlk.
The results are displayed in the Appendix, Table C.5. In this specification the de-
pendent variable (wlk01/07/wlk97/00) is one of four possible outcomes. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is defined as total earnings (not log earnings) between 2001 and 2007
divided by average annual earnings between 1997 and 2000 (Normalised Total Earn-
ings). In Panel B, Total Working Years is the total number of working years between
2001 and 2007. In Panel C, Normalised Average Weekly Earnings is equal to average
weekly earnings between 2001 and 2007 divided by average weekly earnings between
1997 and 2000. In Panel D, Normalised Average Hourly Earnings is equal to average
hourly earnings between 2001 and 2007 divided by average hourly earnings between
1997 and 2000.
The outcomes in Panel A are comparable to the ones in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and
Song (2014). From this point forward, I compare the same groups of workers as they
do (75th vs 25th percentiles of Chinese import exposure). In column 5 the coefficient
of 2.641 implies that comparing an individual initially employed in an industry at the
75th percentile of the Chinese import exposure measure (
∆00/07Importslkchi
Expenditurelk00
= 0.026) to one at
the 25th percentile (
∆00/07Importslkchi
Expenditurelk00
= 0.002), the implied differential in earnings is 6.33%
= 100∗(−2.641)∗(0.026−0.002) of the worker’s initial earnings. Comparing the same
two groups of workers in the US, Autor et al. find a value of 45.8% for a 16-year pe-
riod (between 1992 and 2007). When I divide both coefficients by the number of years
used in each analysis (7 and 16), the effects in the UK and in the US are 0.90% and
2.86%, respectively. This comparison is interesting as it corroborates my counterfactual
results that indicate that US workers in low-tech manufacturing are also more affected
by Chinese imports than employees in the UK in terms of real earnings.
My results show that employment effects in the UK are strong, whereas Autor et
al. find almost no effect for the US. In Panel B of Table C.5, column 5, comparing the
same two groups of workers (75th vs 25th percentiles), the implied differential in the
number of years spent out of employment is 0.06 = (−2.486) ∗ (0.026− 0.002), i.e.,
0.71 more months out of employment. In Panel C, the results do not indicate a clear
effect on Normalised Average Weekly Earnings, as the coefficients are not significant
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and switch signs occasionally. Panel D, however, shows a strong significant effect on
Normalised Average Hourly Earnings, an outcome not analysed by Autor et al. The
earnings differential between a worker at the 75th percentile and one at the 25th is 0.82%
of initial hourly earnings.
Hence, the comparisons between the US and the UK indicate that the earnings effect
is stronger in the US, while the employment effect is stronger in the UK. This may be an
indication that wages are more flexible in the US than in the UK.
4.3.3 Firm-Level Data
In the Appendix, I additionally demonstrate using the BSD firm-level dataset (Table
C.6) that plants in industries that faced more Chinese import exposure shut down more
frequently and/or reduce their size following an import penetration shock. This implies
that the partial-equilibrium effects predicted by my model are robust to firm’s outcomes
as well.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study how countries responded to the recent rise of Chinese trade. I
build a tractable dynamic trade model that delivers simple expressions and incorporates
several features that are important when studying the welfare impact of trade shocks,
namely, imperfect labor markets, job heterogeneity and partial mobility frictions across
sectors. I structurally estimate the model using country-sector level data to quantify
both the losses associated with labor market adjustments and the gains to consumers
generated by cheaper Chinese goods. My counterfactuals show that a fall in trade barriers
between China and the world benefits all countries not only in the new steady state but
also along the transition period. In import competing sectors, however, workers bear a
costly transition, experiencing lower wages and a rise in unemployment.
I also carry out an empirical analysis using UK employer-employee panel data to
validate the micro implications of my model. Consistent with my model predictions,
I find that employees in sectors highly affected by Chinese imports spent more time
out of employment and experienced a drop in earnings when compared to workers in
less affected sectors between 2001 (the year China joined the WTO) and 2007 (the year
before the Great Recession). I also find that low-paid workers are more affected by
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Chinese import exposure.
The results raise important policy questions. The first point is that even facing a
fierce competitor such as China brings benefits to developed economies, implying that
any policy that aims to restrict trade in the name of more protection for workers should be
reconsidered. The trade shock, however, generate winners and losers in the labor market.
Hence, it may be welfare improving finding a way to compensate the losing individuals,
and let the adjustment take place without any type of intervention that hinders trade.
The reader should bear in mind that the gains stemming from trade calculated in
my counterfactuals are likely to be lower bounds, because many other GDP per capita
improving channels associated with trade such as access to cheaper inputs, immigration,
increases in R&D intensity, and vertical production chains, to cite just a few, are not
considered in my analysis.
Finally, my tractable theoretical framework allows for studying other questions that
were beyond the scope of this paper. For example, it is possible to analyze local im-
plications of foreign labor market policies (minimum wage implementation, change in
unemployment benefits and creation/destruction of unions that change workers’ bargain-
ing power).
.
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Appendix A - Theory
I provide a proof sketch for the fact that ptk,izk,i must be equal across markets that produce
in equilibrium (see Sub-subsection 2.1.3). First I will show that this holds in Steady State.
Consider two varieties j and j′ (all the variables associated with variety j′ will be
identified with a “′”). Note that workers are completely mobile across varieties. Then,
using equation 3 and condition 6 we can write:
θ ′k,iq(θ
′
k,i)(W
′
k,i−U ′k,i) = θk,iq(θk,i)(Wk,i−Uk,i). (28)
Now, suppose that p′k,iz
′
k,i and pk,izk,i are not equal, and without loss of generality
assume that p′k,iz
′
k,i > pk,izk,i. This implies that the surplus accruing to workers in market
j′ is higher than in market j (W ′k,i−U ′k,i >Wk,i−Uk,i), and that wages paid in market j′
are also higher. Hence, for equation 28 to hold we must have that θk,iq(θk,i)> θ ′k,iq(θ
′
k,i),
which is satisfied if and only if θk,i > θ ′k,i.
From Pissarides (2000), page 38, we know that the value of posting a vacancy is
increasing in pk,izk,i and we can also see from equation 1 that Vk,i is decreasing in θk,i.
Hence, p′k,iz
′
k,i > pk,izk,i and θk,i > θ
′
k,i imply that V
′
k,i > Vk,i. Consequently, condition 7
cannot be satisfied and no firm will post vacancies in market j. This shows that for both
markets j and j′ to exist in steady state the equality p′k,iz
′
k,i = pk,izk,i must hold.
To see that this must also hold outside the steady state, we can rewrite 28 considering
the time period immediately before the steady state T :
θ ′k,i
T−1q(θ ′k,i
T−1)(W ′k,i
T −U ′k,iT ) = θT−1k,i q(θT−1k,i )(WTk,i−UTk,i). (29)
Given that I showed that p′k,i
T z′k,i = p
T
k,izk,i must hold in T (implying that W
′
k,i
T −
U ′k,i
T =WTk,i−UTk,i), for equation 30 to be satisfied we must have that θ ′k,iT−1 = θT−1k,i .
And from the firm side (using equation 1, condition 7 and the fact that J′k,i
T = JTk,i), the
following must hold:
p′k,i
T−1z′k,i = q(θ
′
k,i
T−1)J′k,i
T (1)/κ(1+ r) = q(θT−1k,i )J
T
k,i(1)/κ(1+ r) = p
T−1
k,i zk,i. (30)
Using the same steps, we can also show that this is valid for any previous period
(T −2,T −3, ...). This completes the proof sketch.
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Appendix B - Counterfactuals and Robustness
B.1 Parameters
Table B.1: Country-Sector Labor Shares (βk,i) and Expenditure Shares (µk,i)
Agriculture Low-Tech Mid-Tech High-Tech Services
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Panel A: βk,i
UK 0.19 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.59
EU 0.32 0.55 0.61 0.50 0.55
China 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.41
US 0.27 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.56
RoW Developed 0.13 0.44 0.54 0.52 0.52
RoW Developing 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.39
Panel B: µk,i
UK 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.79
EU 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.70
China 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.40
US 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.75
RoW Developed 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.66
RoW Developing 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.56
NOTES: Panel A shows the labor share of value added in each sector (βk,i) while panel B show the expenditure share on a particular
sector (µk,i). Author’s calculation using WIOD and WIOD - Socio Economic Accounts database. Data is originally disaggregated
by country and industry-level (roughly ISIC3 2-digit).
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Table B.2: Country-Sector Productivity Parameters: Ak,i
Agriculture Low-Tech Mid-Tech High-Tech Services
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
UK 1.26 1.02 1.11 1.24 0.89
EU 1.84 1.22 1.54 1.42 1.27
China 2.60 2.97 2.54 2.44 2.98
US 1.79 1.38 1.23 1.20 0.94
RoW Developed 0.70 1.28 1.19 1.44 1.11
RoW Developing 2.51 2.02 2.53 1.31 2.58
NOTES: Author’s calculation using GGDC database. Data is originally disaggregated by country and industry-level (roughly ISIC3
2-digit). Productivity is the inverse of the producer price index, aggregated into sector/countries using value added as weights.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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B.2 Transition
I want to find a set of value functions that is consistent with a path that converges to the
new steady state. First, one can verify that my wage equation 14 holds inside and outside
of steady state. Second, V tk,i = 0 will always hold due to the free entry condition.
I will use numerical simulations to find a transition path toward the new steady state.
I am neither claiming that this is the first best path nor the unique one. I am simply
finding one set of value functions compatible with a rational expectations path.
First, I use equation 3, substitute for W tk,i(1)−U tk,i using the sharing rule 5 and the
value of Jtk,i(1) from equation 1 (remember that V
t
k,i = 0) to get:
U tk,i = bi+
βk,iκθ tk,iw˜
t
k
(1−βk,i) +
U t+1k,i
1+ r
. (31)
To find the transition path I use a type of multiple shooting algorithm that builds
on Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) and Lipton, Poterba, Sachs, and Summers
(1982). Even though this algorithm updates explicitly onlyU tk,i, it implies value functions
for workers and firms that are consistent with a rational expectations path (more details
below).
The economy is in equilibrium at time t=0. My counterfactuals consider an unantic-
ipated shock where China’s productivity increase 25% and Chinese bilateral trade costs
around the world decrease 25% in all sectors apart from Services at time t=1.
First I calculate the new steady state equilibrium as described in Subsection 2.2. Then
I conjecture that the system will converge to a new steady state in a certain amount of
time, say Tss= 25 years.48 I guess an initial vector of values stk,i forU
t
k,i (for all countries,
sectors and time t = 1 to time t = Tss). This will permit me to use equations 13, 15 and
23 to solve for R1k,i, θ
1
k,i and w˜
1
k,i, noting that L
1
k,i and u
1
k,i are fixed at this moment.
49
Before workers move across sectors, job creation and job destruction take place and
I can calculate the new number of unemployed individuals in each sector according to
equation 9. Subsequently, I pin down the share of individuals attached to each sector from
equation 24 (remembering that now the value function depends on time) and unemployed
48Note that this type of non-linear systems of equations can only be guaranteed to converge asymptoti-
cally - see Lipton, Poterba, Sachs, and Summers (1982).
49Note that assuming that 13, 15 and 23 hold outside the steady state is an approximation. I later confirm
that this approximation is a reasonable one.
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individuals are reallocated according to such shares.50 I proceed to t = 2 and continue
like this up to time Tss to find a time path for Rtk,i, θ
t
k,i, w˜
t
k,i, L
t
k,i and u
t
k,i. I then update
values s˜tk,i of s
t
k,i using equation 31, s˜
t
k,i= bi+
βk,iκθ tk,iw˜
t
k
(1−βk,i) +
st+1k,i
1+r , and use the assumption that
the system is in steady state at Tss, s˜
Tss−1
k,i = bi+
βk,iκθ
Tss−1
k,i w˜
Tss−1
k
(1−βk,i) +
sTssk,i
1+r . I then compare s˜
t
k,i
to stk,i and if they are close enough according to my tolerance I stop. Otherwise, I restart
the algorithm using my updated values. The algorithm converges quickly to a high degree
of precision. Even though this algorithm updates explicitly only U tk,i, the transition path
found is almost equal to one where I update other value functions as well.51
I keep Tss always equal to 25, but the higher its value the closer the variables are to
the new steady state counterfactual equilibrium. In my exercises, approximately 90% of
the real income adjustment has already taken place by Tss = 25.
In the algorithm there are two implicit simplifying assumptions that are not necessary
to find the steady state equilibrium. First, I need to assume that after the shock the indi-
viduals willing to move (with relatively low νk(l)’s) are the ones unemployed. Without
this assumption, the transition would take even longer as it would be necessary that these
individuals lost their jobs before moving to another sector. Second, I assume that if a
variety ceases to be produced in a sector at some point in time, all matches producing
that variety with an idiosyncratic productivity level above the equilibrium threshold Rtk,i
can freely reallocate to a producing variety (pushing low productivity matches out of
business and reinforcing the effect on Rtk,i). Without this assumption, the problem would
be significantly more complicated as the identity of the variety would also be a choice
variable for the agents in the economy.
50I am always using the Gumbel distribution to calculate the total number of individuals attached to each
sector and allowing only the unemployed to move such that these shares are satisfied. A possibly more
precise (and more complicated) alternative would be to find the distribution of unemployed individuals
conditional on individuals previous sector choices and then find the share of individuals moving across
sectors.
51To verify this I use an algorithm where I update both Jtk,i(1) andU
t
k,i, andW
t
k,i(1) can then be found by
the surplus sharing condition. These value functions, together with the endogenous variables are sufficient
to calculate all other value functions. In this algorithm I do not assume that 13, 15 and 23 hold outside
steady state, but the fact that the two transition paths (the one calculated with this algorithm and the one
used in the paper) are almost indistinguishable show this was a reasonable approximation. The downside
of this second algorithm is that it is sensitive to the initial guess, converging only for initial values of Jtk,i(1)
and U tk,i around the ones obtained in the final iteration of the first algorithm used in the paper.
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B.3 Labor Movement and Inequality
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Figure B.1: Relative Labor Force per Sector in the UK and in the US
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services.
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Figure B.2: UK Wage Inequality
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. In panel (a) wage inequality defined as the ratio between the maximum and
the minimum wage in the UK, considering only employed individuals. In panel (b) wage inequality is defined as the ratio between
the maximum wage and the value of unemployment benefit in the UK.
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B.4 Welfare
In the main part of the paper I use real consumption per capita as a proxy for welfare.
In the context of the model, however, a proper welfare measure should consider workers
expectations about the future and their (dis)utility of moving across sectors. I present
such a measure here and show its change over time in my counterfactual exercise.
WWel f ti =∑
k
Ltk,i(U
t
k,iu
t
k,i+W¯
t
k,i(1−utk,i)+Et [νk(l)|k = max{1, ...K}]), (32)
Where W¯ tk,i denotes the average (over idiosyncratic productivity x) value function for
a worker in sector k. I first obtain a closed form solution for this measure in steady state.
To find this, I plug the wage equation 14 into 2 and subtract J(R) = 0 from J(x) to get:
Jk,i(x) =
(1−βk,i)(1+ r)
r+ρ
w˜k,i(x−Rk,i). (33)
The next step is to combine 33 and the surplus sharing rule 5 to obtain:
Wk,i(x) =Uk,i+
(1+ r)
r+ρ
βk,iw˜k,i(x−Rk,i). (34)
Notice that Wk,i(x) is a linear function of x, and hence, W¯k,i(x) =Wk,i(x¯). As shown
in Subsection 2.2, the average productivity in steady state is equal to Rk,i+
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s).
From Dubin (1985) I obtain
E[νk(l)|k = max{1, ...K}] = ζ [γ− ln(Pr[νk(l)+Uk,i ≥ νk′(l)+Uk′,i f or k′ = 1, ...K])],
(35)
where γ is the Euler constant. Hence, my welfare expression is:
WWel fi =∑
k
Ltk,i(Uk,i+
(1+ r)
r+ρ
βk,iw˜k,i
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s)+E[νk(l)|k = max{1, ...K}]), (36)
where E[νk(l)|k = max{1, ...K}] is given by 35.
To calculate this measure outside the steady state, I first back-out U tk,i, u
t
k,i, w˜
t
k,i,
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Rtk,i, E
t [νk(l)|k = max{1, ...K}] and the average idiosyncratic productivity x¯t (by sec-
tor/country) directly from the transition algorithm. I approximate Wk,i(x) by its steady
state value, i.e., I consider that expression 34 is also valid outside the steady state (some-
thing that is not necessarily true). Hence, I can simply use 36 at every point in time to
calculate workers’ welfare (noting that I substitute x¯t−Rtk,i for
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s)).
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Figure B.3: World Workers’ Welfare
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Welfare relative to the initial steady state equilibrium.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
Figure B.3 shows the welfare measure for all countries over time. Workers gain
around the world, but the gains are different from the ones shown in Figure 1a, mainly
because of the (dis)utility of workers moving across sectors. China benefits the most,
followed by RoW Developed, UK, EU, USA and RoW Developing. In the new steady
state China’s gain is of 11.44% (compared to 23.11% of real consumption gains), while
the UK and the USA gain 2.3% and 1.31 %, respectively (compared to real consumption
59
gains of 2.68% and 2.13%). Hence, the movement of workers across sectors is costly
for these countries, especially for China. On the other hand, the EU benefits from the
reallocation of workers (2.51% versus 1.02%).
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B.5 Counterfactuals Robustness to Changes in Parameters
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Figure B.4: Change in parameter: ζ = 31.25
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the maximum wage and the value of
unemployment benefit in the UK. Legends of Panels B, C and D can be found in Panel B.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Figure B.5: Change in parameter: λ = 6.453
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the maximum wage and the value of
unemployment benefit in the UK. Legends of Panels B, C and D can be found in Panel B.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Figure B.6: Change in parameter: ρ = 0.0674
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a rise of 25% in
Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the maximum wage and the value of
unemployment benefit in the UK. Legends of Panels B, C and D can be found in Panel B.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Appendix C - Micro Implications of the Model: Data and
Results
C.1 Data Sources
BSD
To calculate sales per industry, a measure used in my import penetration variable, I use
the Business Structure Database (BSD). It contains information on employment, sales
and industry of activity for almost all business organizations in the UK. The BSD is
derived mainly from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), which is a live
register of data collected by HM Revenue and Customs via VAT and Pay As You Earn
records. The IDBR data are complimented using business surveys from the Office for
National Statistics (ONS). If a business is liable for VAT and/or has at least one member
of staff registered for the Pay as you Earn52 tax collection system, then the business will
appear on the IDBR (and hence in the BSD). Businesses listed on the IDBR accounted
for almost 99 per cent of economic activity in the UK around 2004. Only very small
businesses (such as the self-employed) were not found on the register.
ARD
I use another firm data source, the Annual Respondent Database (ARD). The ARD is
a census of large businesses, and a sample of smaller ones.53 The advantage of ARD
is that it encompasses much more detailed information than BSD. Hence, I am able to
calculate, for example, firm’s labor productivity, R&D intensity, wage bill and other
important information used also for the structural estimation of my model in Section 3.
UN COMTRADE
Data on exports and imports use in the validation of the micro implications of the model
come from the UN COMTRADE database. It carries information on all bilateral trade
flows between any given pair of countries available at the 5-digit standard international
trade classification revision 3 (SITC3). To create a correspondence between this trade
classification and the industry classification in ASHE, BSD and ARD (5-digit UK stan-
dard industrial classification - UK SIC) I considered a third classification: the 4-digit
international standard industrial classification revision 3 (ISIC3). Both SITC3 and UK
52PAYE is the system that HM Revenue and Customs uses to collect Income Tax and National Insurance
contributions from employees.
53For more details see http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=6644.
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SIC can be easily aggregated to ISIC3, providing a consistent classification for my anal-
ysis.
C.2 UK Import Exposure to China
Table C.1 shows which industries were affected by China between 2000 and 2007 and
the size of those industries in terms of employment in 2000. The greatest increase in
import penetration occurred in low-tech manufacturing sectors. Several industries that
faced more Chinese competition had sizeable shares of the labor force in tradable sec-
tors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing) in 2000. The heavily affected industries
are generally linked to textiles, furniture and machinery production. The sectors that
observed lower increase in import penetration are inside agriculture and mining.
Table C.1: Industry Employment and Import Exposure
Sector ∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure (
Importschi
Expenditure)00 (Employment Share)00
Wearing Apparel 0.173 0.069 3.21%
Tanning and Dressing of Leather 0.146 0.179 0.6%
Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 0.097 0.048 1.11%
Radio, Television and Communication Equipment 0.081 0.023 3.04%
Textiles 0.080 0.030 3.48%
Furniture and Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.071 0.063 4.97%
Electrical Machinery 0.034 0.029 4.61%
Machinery and Equipment 0.033 0.015 9.21%
Wood and Cork (except furniture) 0.030 0.010 1.86%
Basic Metals 0.029 0.004 2.40%
Fabricated Metal Products ∗A 0.028 0.020 5.14%
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.023 0.005 3.36%
Rubber and Plastic 0.014 0.020 5.68%
Medical, Optical and Other Instruments ∗B 0.009 0.016 3.61%
Paper 0.009 0.003 2.53%
Forestry and Logging 0.005 0.007 0.25%
Chemicals 0.005 0.007 6.58%
Publishing and Printing ∗C 0.004 0.004 8.20%
Other Transport Equipment 0.003 0.005 3.81%
Other Mining and Quarrying 0.003 0.002 0.87%
Fishing 0.003 0.001 0.28%
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 0.002 0.000 5.18%
Mining of Coal and Lignite 0.002 0.004 0.32%
Food and Beverages 0.002 0.001 11.61%
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 0.000 0.001 0.66%
Tobacco 0.000 0.000 0.22%
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.000 0.000 0.35%
Agriculture and Hunting -0.000 0.004 6.86%
Total 100%
NOTES: Table considers only tradable industries (agriculture, manufacturing and mining). Changes in Chines import penetration
from 2000 to 2007, Chinese import penetration measure in 2000 and employment shares in 2000 by industry (ISIC3 2-digit). The
denominator of this last measure considers only tradable industries.
∗A Excludes machinery and equipment.
∗B Includes watches and clocks.
∗C Includes reproduction of recorded media.
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Figure C.1: Changes in industry log Employment against Chinese Import Exposure
NOTES: Figure plots changes in employment between 2000 and 2007 against changes in exposure to Chinese imports in the UK at
the 4-digit ISIC3 industry level. All points (and fitted line) consider industry employment size in 2000 as weights. β represents the
coefficient of the fitted line (standard error of 0.53).
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C.3 Summary Statistics
Table C.2: Summary Statistics
Average Average Total Total
Hourly Weekly Earnings Working HE97/00 ∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure IVquota
Earnings Earnings Years
Obs 23418 23433 23433 24888 24888 24888 24888
Mean 2.335 5.971 11.372 4.540 2.210 0.025 0.020
Std. Dev 0.467 0.537 0.829 2.124 0.456 0.038 0.099
Min - - - - - -0.014 0
10th Pctile 1.791 5.341 10.227 1.000 1.659 0.000 0.000
50th Pctile 2.281 5.984 11.510 5.000 2.180 0.007 0.000
90th Pctile 2.957 6.600 12.271 7.000 2.798 0.079 0.000
Max - - - - - 0.165 0.603
NOTES: Summary statistics for the full sample of individuals from years 2000 to 2007. Some statistics are omitted because of data
confidentiality reasons.
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C.4 Empirical Robustness
I also make use of another instrument based on Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011).
This IV uses the idea that many Chinese products in the textile industry had importing
quotas until China entered in the WTO (2001). Since these quotas were first implemented
in the fifties and their phased abolition negotiations started in the eighties, it is natural
to assume that they are exogenous to current demand and supply shocks in the UK. As
quotas started to be liberalised, imports in these protected sectors increased significantly.
To build my IV I first calculate the fraction of products54 that were under quota restric-
tion in a given industry k before the liberalization phase in the 2000’s. The number of
industries under quotas is extremely small under the ISIC3 classification55, which makes
this simple fraction a poor IV. To add more variability to my instrument, I use the aver-
age value of the quota share in the industries where each worker was between 1997 and
2000. My new IV is given by:
IVquota =
∑
t<2001
quotalkt
T
,
where T is the number of years that an individual was employed between 1997 and
2000 and quotalkt is the share of products that had quotas in worker’s industry of activity
at time t. Clearly this IV has its own issues. Even though I use workers’ pre-period in-
dustry switch, this information may still reflect anticipation to China shocks. In this case
my IV would not be strictly exogenous. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011) claim
that this anticipation effect is unlikely to have had larger effects on R&D investment as
there was considerable uncertainty about quota liberalizations at that point.56
The results are not qualitatively different from the ones in Subsection 4.2, giving
further support to my findings. The size of the coefficients in Table C.3 are larger. For
example, the effect on Total Working Years, column 5, implies that an individual in the
54Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2011) use the same idea but have a value weighted share as the
instrument.
55The 7 industries with non-zero values and respective quota measures are: 1711 Preparation and spin-
ning of textile fibres (0.51); 1721 Manufacture of made-up textiles (0.068); 1722 Manufacture of carpets
and rugs (0.087); 1723 Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting (0.5); 1729 Manufacture of tex-
tiles n.e.c ( 0.016); 1730 Manufacture of knitted crochet fabrics (0.375); 1810 Manufacturing of wearing
apparel (0.603).
56The authors find no correlation between their quota instrument and pre-period R&D adjustments.
This suggests that this anticipation effect would also be small or nonexistent regarding pre-period labor
adjustments.
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90th percentile of import penetration experienced 0.36 more years out of employment
when compared to a median worker. The first stage statistics are slightly weaker than in
Table 5, but are still significant at standard levels.
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Table C.3: Employment and Earnings: Industry Quotas as IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Total Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.849*** -1.900*** -1.263*** -1.760*** -1.372***
(0.287) (0.189) (0.182) (0.275) (0.273)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.045) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 17.888 13.927 17.579 16.507
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -2.003*** -4.713*** -4.667*** -5.093*** -5.010***
(0.646) (0.810) (0.924) (1.155) (1.136)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189∗∗∗ .165∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .175∗∗∗
(.044) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 18.334 13.983 17.851 16.411
Observations 24888 24888 24887 24201 24200
Panel C Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.422** -1.048*** -0.508*** -0.862*** -0.566***
(0.178) (0.139) (0.095) (0.139) (0.115)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.045) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 17.888 13.927 17.579 16.507
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel D Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.343** -0.816*** -0.619*** -0.744*** -0.618***
(0.142) (0.196) (0.159) (0.198) (0.169)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.045) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 17.874 13.936 17.565 16.502
Observations 23418 23418 23417 22790 22789
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes
Industry Controls II Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in industry j (in
2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to Total Working Years multiplied
by average annual earnings [mean in the full-sample = 11.372]). Panel B) Total Working Years - the number of years employed [mean
in the full-sample = 4.540]; Panel C) log of Average Weekly Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 5.97]); Panel D) log of Average
Hourly Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 2.335]; Panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from 2001
to 2007. Column 1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’
industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average hourly and
weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) between 1997 and 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects (4-
digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes
for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing
measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period
change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW,
real (log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment
in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVquota, is the average value of the quota
share in the industries where each worker was between 1997 and 2000. Quota share is the fraction of Chinese products that were
under quota restriction in a given industry before the liberalization phase in the 2000’s. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3
- 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table C.4: Employment and Earnings: Shift-Share IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Total Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.849*** -1.376*** -0.974*** -1.475*** -0.930*
(0.287) (0.301) (0.244) (0.569) (0.550)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.78∗∗∗ 43.821∗∗∗ 41.713∗∗∗ 37.676∗∗∗
(5.977) (6.568) (8.948) (8.508)
KP F Stat 61.256 44.507 21.734 19.608
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -2.003*** -2.884*** -2.618** -2.849 -2.210
(0.646) (0.802) (0.823) (1.799) (2.038)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.901∗∗∗ 44.08∗∗∗ 41.18∗∗∗ 37.16∗∗∗
(5.952) (6.531) (8.959) (8.587)
KP F Stat 62.085 45.559 21.13 18.727
Observations 24888 24888 24887 24201 24200
Panel C Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.422** -0.710*** -0.385*** -0.829*** -0.487**
(0.178) (0.175) (0.099) (0.273) (0.224)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.78∗∗∗ 43.821∗∗∗ 41.713∗∗∗ 37.676∗∗∗
(5.977) (6.568) (8.948) (8.508)
KP F Stat 61.256 44.507 21.734 19.608
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel D Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.343** -0.404** -0.324*** -0.357 -0.296
(0.142) (0.167) (0.099) (0.280) (0.196)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.829∗∗∗ 43.903∗∗∗ 41.72∗∗∗ 37.697∗∗∗
(5.974) (6.567) (8.959) (8.521)
KP F Stat 61.445 44.695 21.683 19.571
Observations 23418 23418 23417 22790 22789
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls II No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in industry j (in 2000)
in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to Total Working Years multiplied by
average annual earnings [mean in the full-sample = 11.372]). Panel B) Total Working Years - the number of years employed [mean in
the full-sample = 4.540]; Panel C) log of Average Weekly Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 5.97]); Panel D) log of Average Hourly
Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 2.335]; Panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from 2001 to 2007.
Column 1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’ industry of
employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average hourly and weekly earnings
(HE97/00 and WE97/00) between 1997 and 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects (4-digit) and a part-
time job dummy. “Industry Controls II” include pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes for two different
periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of
input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999)
in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW and from China, real
(log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment in
machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration
from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering
the worker’s initial 2-digit ISIC3 industry of employment. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3 digit) in parentheses. ∗
p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table C.5: Normalised Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Normalized Total Earnings
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
-1.364 -4.392*** -2.855** -3.624** -2.461
(1.669) (1.184) (1.114) (1.597) (1.547)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 48.028∗∗∗ 43.616∗∗∗ 45.853∗∗∗ 42.232∗∗∗
(7.594) (6.789) (7.649) (6.693)
KP F Stat 39.995 41.27 35.933 39.809
Observations 20140 20137 20136 19572 19571
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
-2.774*** -4.032*** -3.006*** -3.272*** -2.486**
(0.979) (1.004) (0.951) (1.081) (1.151)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 47.931∗∗∗ 43.505∗∗∗ 45.807∗∗∗ 42.314∗∗∗
(7.707) (6.941) (7.630) (6.694)
KP F Stat 38.673 39.289 36.042 39.954
Observations 21412 21409 21408 20791 20790
Panel C Normalized Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
0.161 -0.125 0.010 0.073 0.183
(0.206) (0.183) (0.232) (0.306) (0.349)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 48.028∗∗∗ 43.616∗∗∗ 45.853∗∗∗ 42.232∗∗∗
(7.594) (6.789) (7.649) (6.693)
KP F Stat 39.995 41.270 35.933 39.809
Observations 20140 20137 20136 19572 19571
Panel D Normalized Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
0.124 -0.266* -0.193 -0.409* -0.344*
(0.246) (0.150) (0.140) (0.215) (0.191)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 48.024∗∗∗ 43.637∗∗∗ 45.830∗∗∗ 42.210∗∗∗
(7.599) (6.795) (7.657) (6.702)
KP F Stat 39.939 41.240 35.828 39.668
Observations 20124 20121 20120 19556 19555
Worker Controls. No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in industry j (in
2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) Normalised Total Earnings - total earnings between 2001 and 2007
divided by average annual earnings between 1997 and 2000 [mean in the full-sample = 5.85]). Panel B) Total Working Years -
the number of years employed between 2001 and 2007 [mean in the full-sample = 4.58]; Panel C) Normalised Average Weekly
Earnings - average weekly earnings between 2001 and 2007 divided by average weekly earnings between 1997 and 2000 [mean in
the full-sample = 1.201]); Panel D) Normalised Average Hourly Earnings - average hourly earnings between 2001 and 2007 divided
by average hourly earnings between 1997 and 2000 [mean in the full-sample = 1.162].; Panels C and D exclude individuals with
zero years of employment from 2001 to 2007. Column 1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration
(2000-2007) relative to workers’ industry of employment in 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects (4-
digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes
for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing
measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period
change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW,
real (log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment
in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration
from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering
all tradable industries. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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C.5 Firms
Using information from the BSD I also investigate firms’ outcomes that are tightly related
to unemployment and earnings. My empirical approach is similar to the one presented
in Subsection 4.1, but i indexes firms instead of workers. My initial time period is still
2000, but different from the worker analysis I now include new entrants in my sample,
i.e., I also consider firms that entered in any year after (and including) 2001 in some
specifications. I allocate to all firms the same import shock (change in import penetration
2000/2007).
My dependent variables are either: i) Activity Status, a dummy variable equals to 1 if
a firm was alive in 2007 and 0 otherwise; or ii) Employment Growth, defined as change
in ln(employment) between 2000 and 2007 considering only surviving plants.
I focus on local units, which is generally equivalent to plant level data. My set of
controls in Table C.6, “Firm Level Controls”, include enterprise birth date fixed effects
and a dummy for enterprise foreign ownership in the starting period. “Industry Controls”
include the same variables described in the main text.
The results are strong both in the extensive and in the intensive margin of job de-
struction, giving further support to the partial-equilibrium effects generated by my coun-
terfactuals. Looking at the 5th column, a 1 percentage point increase in Chinese import
penetration leads to an increase of 0.96 percentage points in the probability of death of
a firm and to a reduction of 2.256 percentage points in the annual employment growth
between 2000 and 2007. Hence, plants shut down and/or reduce their size following an
import penetration shock.
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Table C.6: Firms - Local Units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Activity Status
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -1.670*** -2.021*** -1.364*** -0.998* -0.964*
(0.460) (0.649) (0.313) (0.570) (0.542)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 18.233∗∗∗ 17.504∗∗∗ 14.345∗∗∗ 14.172∗∗∗
(2.222) (2.552) (1.976) (1.982)
KP F Stat 67.316 47.035 52.702 51.144
Observations 364814 363777 297002 270819 216224
Panel B Employment Growth
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure 0.375 -0.335 -1.879*** -1.766*** -2.256***
(0.568) (0.939) (0.509) (0.593) (0.453)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 17.602∗∗∗ 16.587∗∗∗ 13.358∗∗∗ 13.308∗∗∗
(2.822) (3.109) (2.359) (2.351)
KP F Stat 38.909 28.457 32.074 32.03
Observations 124083 123888 123888 73055 73055
Firm Controls No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 62 62
NOTES: Estimations considering plant level data. Each panel represents a different dependent variable. Panel A) Activity Status, a
dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm was alive in 2007 and 0 otherwise [mean in the full-sample = 0.499]; Panel B) Employment
Growth, defined as change in ln(employment) between 2000 and 2007 considering only surviving plants [mean in the full-sample
= 1.44]. Panel B considers only surviving plants from 2000 to 2007, while Panel A considers dead and surviving plants, as well as
new entrants. Column 1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration relative to plants’ industry of
employment in 2000 or plants’ industry in its entry year if plant enters after 2000. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment
growth and pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996
(4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit
industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels
of import penetration from the RoW, real (log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase
of computer services and real investment in machinery, all in 2000. “Firm Controls” include enterprise birth date fixed effects and
a dummy for enterprise foreign ownership in the starting period. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration,
IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world
(2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering all tradable industries. Robust standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit)
in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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